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INTRODUCTION 
 
FIGURE 1
1 
 
 
 
In 2009, the year that Barack Obama began his administration as 
President, union density—which measures the percentage of employees 
in the United States workforce who are unionized—was 12.3%.  As of 
 
 1. Nonfarm payroll data taken from the Database on Institutional Characteristics of 
Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS Database). 
Information on union density from 1955–2004 taken from Gerald Mayer, Union 
Membership Trends in the United States, Congressional Research Service (2004),  
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1176&context=key_workp
lace. Union density from 2005 to 2011 taken from ICTWSS database. J. Visser, ICTWSS 
Data base. version 5.1. Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
(AIAS), University of Amsterdam. September 2016. Open access database at: uva-
aias.net/en/ictwss 
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2015, seven years into his presidency, union density stood at 11.1%.
2
 
These numbers should trouble the U.S. Labor movement.  The numbers 
also should raise a question anew—what can be done to restore the 
U.S. Labor Movement?  As the above Figure 1 shows, Labor’s decline 
has continued for more than a generation.  It was not stopped by the 
collective efforts of the presidential administrations of Carter, Clinton, 
or Obama, even though all of these presidents enjoyed the support of 
Democratic Congressional Majorities for at least a portion of their 
terms. 
It has not been for lack of effort.  Labor has attempted to address 
the reform of U.S. labor laws through major legislation when the 
opportunity has arisen.  In 1977, it supported the Labor Law Reform 
Act of 1977.
3
  In 2007 and 2009, it supported the Employee Free 
Choice Act.
4
  The current vehicle for Labor’s reform effort is the 
Workplace Action for a Growing Economy, or “WAGE” Act.5 
Problematically, however, the prospects for passing major 
legislative reforms are not strong.  Most political observers do not 
believe that Labor’s allies in the Democratic Party can regain control of 
the U.S. Congress in the foreseeable future.
6
  Labor’s best chance for 
reform, therefore, is at the administrative level with the way the 
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB,” or the “Board”) interprets 
and enforces the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA,” or the 
“Act”).7 
This Article argues that significant, large-impact reform by the 
NLRB is possible.  A 1949 doctrine arising from Joy Silk Mills, Inc. 
held that a union could obtain a bargaining order from the NLRB if it: 
(1) obtained authorization cards from a majority of an employer’s 
employees, and (2) requested recognition from the employer, only to 
have the employer refuse recognition and then proceed to commit 
unfair labor practices.
 8
  Persuading the NLRB to resurrect the Joy Silk 
doctrine would achieve potentially game-changing reform of U.S. labor 
law.  Moreover, such a change is legally viable and likely to be 
 
 2. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members -2015, 
USDL-16-0158 (Jan.  28, 2016); U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union 
Members - 2009, USDL-10-0069 (Jan.  22, 2010). 
 3. H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., (1st Sess. 1977). 
 4. See H.R. 800, 110th Cong., (1st Sess. 2007), 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr800; H.R. 1409, 111th Cong., (1st Sess. 2009). 
 5. S. 2042, 114th Cong., (1st Sess. 2015). 
 6. Nate Cohn, Why Democrats Can’t Win the House, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2014, at 
SR1. 
 7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. 
 8. See Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1264 (1949), modified and enforced, 
Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950). 
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sustained by federal appellate courts. 
After presenting this argument to supporters of the Labor 
Movement, it is clear from the responses that there is work to do in 
making the case that this strategy would be viable and would achieve 
meaningful improvements.  The purpose of this Article, therefore, is to 
make those cases. 
In Part I, the Article briefly reviews the background of the Joy Silk 
doctrine and how it came to be replaced by the doctrine of Gissel 
Packing Co.
9
 and abandoned by the NLRB.
10
 
In Part II, the Article argues that the NLRB can, as a matter of 
administrative discretion, re-adopt the Joy Silk doctrine as part of its 
interpretation and enforcement of the NLRA.  The peculiar 
circumstances under which the NLRB abandoned the Joy Silk doctrine 
involved an arguably rogue government attorney, whose performance 
at oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court appears to be 
responsible for the loss of the doctrine.  From this, the Article argues 
that the abandonment of Joy Silk likely was not intentional and was not 
supported by a compelling legal rationale, and that a return to the 
doctrine has not been foreclosed by the Supreme Court. 
In Part III, the Article presents the analytical and empirical case 
for re-adopting the Joy Silk doctrine.  This Part will include a 
discussion of why Gissel, the doctrine that substituted for Joy Silk, did 
not provide the same deterrence against unfair labor practices (ULPs) 
during union organizing drives.  Due to its doctrinal indeterminacy and 
its status as an extraordinary remedy, Gissel actually provides 
substantial incentives to employers to commit ULPs during union 
organizing efforts.  The Article also presents an extended argument 
based upon empirical evidence that the abandonment of Joy Silk 
triggered a massive increase in the commission of ULPs during union 
organizing campaigns, and that the re-adoption of Joy Silk will lead to 
a reduction of ULPs during organizing campaign of a similar 
magnitude. 
In Part IV, the Article recommends adjustments to the Joy Silk 
doctrine to accommodate legal developments in the rights of 
employees under Section 7 of the Act to refrain from union activity that 
arose following Joy Silk’s abandonment.  These rights can be 
safeguarded by modifying the application of the NLRB’s contract bar 
rule in cases where a collective bargaining agreement results from a 
bargaining order.  The NLRB’s contract bar rule provides that no 
representation election will be held during the first three years of a 
 
 9. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 599 n.13 (1969). 
 10. See infra Part I. 
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collective bargaining agreement.
11
  When the NLRB issues a 
bargaining order, however, I recommend that the contract bar be 
withheld until the union obtains certification through an election.  This 
modest change will safeguard employees’ access to a secret-ballot 
election, but do so within a framework that maximally neutralizes the 
employer’s incentive to violate the Act with the purpose of dissipating 
the union’s support. 
In Part V, the Article argues that restoring Joy Silk to U.S. labor 
law will have a game-changing impact on U.S. labor relations.  To 
support this claim, the Article attempts to demonstrate that the 
abandonment of Joy Silk was a pivotal development in U.S. labor law 
that heavily contributed to the subsequent decline of the American 
Labor Movement.  The abandonment of Joy Silk and its replacement by 
Gissel created a new landscape that proved inhospitable to union 
organizing and has led to dramatic decreases in NLRB elections.  From 
this, the Article argues that a restoration of the Joy Silk doctrine should 
be expected to dramatically improve the ability of unions to organize 
and grow, which is to say, restoring Joy Silk would constitute 
meaningful labor law reform. 
I. THE REPLACEMENT OF JOY SILK WITH GISSEL 
Since the earliest days of the NLRA, the NLRB has enforced the 
law with respect to violations of § 8(a)(5)
12
 even where the union has 
not been voluntarily recognized or certified by winning an election. 
The original Wagner Act provided:  
Whenever a question affecting commerce arises concerning the 
representation of employees, the Board may investigate such 
controversy and certify . . . the name or names of the 
representatives that have been designated or selected. In any such 
investigation, the Board . . . may take a secret ballot of employees, 
or utilize any other suitable method to ascertain such 
representatives.
13
  
Between 1935 and 1947, the NLRB relied upon this provision to 
certify unions without holding elections.
14
 
In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act repealed the provision that permitted 
the Board to certify a union by a means other than an election.  After 
 
 11. See generally General Cable Corp., 139 NLRB 1123 (1962). 
 12. Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA prohibits an employer from failing to bargain 
collectively with a representative of its employees, as defined in Section 9(a) of the Act.  29 
U.S.C. 158(a)(5).  Section 8(d) of the NLRA defines bargaining collectively to require 
negotiation “in good faith.”  29 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
 13. See Gissel, supra note 9; See also 49 Stat. 449 § 9(c) (July 5, 1935). 
 14. See Gissel, supra note 9, at 596. 
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Taft-Hartley, an election was the only means through which the Board 
could certify a union as an exclusive representative within the meaning 
of Section 9(a) of the Act.  Despite this change, however, the Board 
continued to find violations of Section 8(a)(5) when an employer 
violated its duty to collectively bargain in good faith with a union that 
had been “designated” as an exclusive representative by a majority of 
employees, but had not been certified through an election.  The Board 
first announced that it would continue to enforce Section 8(a)(5) in this 
context in Joy Silk Mills, Inc.
15
  In Joy Silk, the NLRB announced a 
policy that an employer will be ordered to recognize and bargain with a 
union if the general counsel establishes the following: (1) that the 
union represented a majority of workers in an appropriate bargaining 
unit, (2) the union requested recognition, (3) the employer denied the 
request for recognition while lacking a good faith doubt as to the 
union’s majority status, and (4) the employer took action calculated to 
dissipate the union’s majority status.16 
The elimination of the Joy Silk doctrine is a matter of public 
record.  Joy Silk disappeared as valid labor law on the morning of June 
16, 1969, when the Supreme Court of the United States announced its 
opinion in the case of NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.
17
 Based on this 
incident, one might guess that the U.S. Supreme Court ended the Joy 
Silk doctrine. Yet the Supreme Court explicitly denied playing any role 
in Joy Silk’s rejection.18 Rather, the Supreme Court stated that the 
NLRB “abandoned” it.19 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court proceeded in 
Gissel to adopt a new doctrine under which the Board would order an 
employer to bargain with an uncertified and unrecognized union if the 
NLRB’s General Counsel proved that the employer committed ULPs 
that have made the conduct of a fair election unlikely or impossible, 
even if the NLRB attempted to use its traditional remedies to fix the 
situation.
20
 
Did the NLRB “abandon” Joy Silk as the Supreme Court 
suggests?  Here, the record is murky.  To begin, the Supreme Court’s 
description of how the Board “abandoned” Joy Silk is highly unusual.  
The Court’s opinion explains that, “although the Board’s brief before 
this Court generally followed the approach as set out in Aaron Brothers 
. . . the Board announced at oral argument that it had virtually 
 
 15. Joy Silk, supra note 8, at 741.   
 16. Id.; see also Aaron Bros.  Co., 158 N.L.R.B.  1077, 1079 (1966). 
 17. See Gissel, supra note 9, at 590.   
 18. See id.  at 594 (stating that the Board made the decision to abandon the Joy Silk 
doctrine following the submission of its brief to the Court). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id.   
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abandoned the Joy Silk doctrine altogether.”21  Thus, according to the 
Supreme Court, the NLRB changed its position sometime between 
filing its brief with the Court and appearing for oral argument in March 
of 1969.  The problem is that, if the NLRB did change its policy on Joy 
Silk during this period, it created no public record of the change.  The 
official record, therefore, creates a mystery. A best guess of what really 
happened is discussed in Part II, infra. 
Meanwhile, in 1971, the Board severed all remaining ties to Joy 
Silk in Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co.
22
 In this case, the 
Board made clear that an employer has no obligation to file a petition 
for an election even where it refused to recognize and bargain with a 
union who presented unequivocal evidence of majority support.
23
  In 
establishing this rule, the NLRB made clear that it no longer would 
conduct any inquiry whatsoever into the employer’s good faith, or lack 
thereof, for refusing to recognize a union who offered it evidence of 
majority support.
24
  In the Supreme Court’s review of the Board’s new 
policy, a 5-4 decision narrowly affirmed that the policy was not an 
abuse of the Board’s discretion.25 
In announcing its decision in Linden Lumber, the NLRB offered a 
rationale for abandoning Joy Silk for the first time: 
How are we to evaluate whether [the employer] “knows” or 
whether it “doubts” majority status? And if we are to let our 
decisions turn on an employer’s “willingness” to have majority 
status determined by an election, how are we to judge “willingness” 
if the record is silent, as in Wilder, or doubtful, as here, as to just 
how “willing” the Respondent is in fact? We decline, in summary, 
to reenter the “good-faith” thicket of Joy Silk, which we announced 
to the Supreme Court in Gissel we had “virtually abandoned . . . 
altogether.
26
 
II.   THE BOARD RETAINS DISCRETION TO RE-ADOPT JOY SILK. 
A.  The Board Has Discretion to Reverse Its Prior Positions. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that, in developing labor 
relations policy for the nation, the Board is entitled to substantial 
deference.  The prevailing standard provides that: 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 719, 720-21 (1971) (citations 
omitted). 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 309–10 (1974).   
 26. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 719, 720-21 (1971) (citations 
omitted). 
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[s]o long as the Board’s construction . . . is at least permissible 
under [the Act], and insofar as the Board’s application of that 
meaning engages in the ‘difficult and delicate responsibility’ of 
reconciling conflicting interests of labor and management, the 
balance struck by the Board is ‘subject to limited judicial review.’
27
 
The Board’s entitlement to substantial deference arises from its 
recognition by the Supreme Court as “expert in federal national labor 
relations policy . . . [with] vested responsibility for developing that 
policy . . .”28  In fact: 
[i]t is the province of the Board, not the courts, to determine 
whether or not the ‘need’ exists in light of changing industrial 
practices and the Board’s cumulative experience in dealing with 
labor-management relations. For the Board has the ‘special 
function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the 
complexities of industrial life, and its special competence in this 
field is the justification for the deference accorded its 
determination.
29
 
The deference due to the Board even applies where the Board is 
reversing itself from prior positions.
30
  As the Supreme Court has held, 
“[a]n administrative agency is not disqualified from changing its mind; 
and when it does, the courts still sit in review of the administrative 
decision and should not approach the statutory construction issue de 
novo and without regard to the administrative understanding of the 
statutes.”31  Under this guidance, courts generally have deferred to the 
Board with respect to significant changes in Board policy.
32
 
 
 27. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266–67 (1975); see also NLRB v. 
Curtin Matheson Sci., Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786–87 (1990) (“We will uphold a Board rule as 
long as it is rational and consistent with the Act,” (citing Fall River Dyeing & Finishing 
Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 37 (1987)), even if we would have formulated a different rule 
had we sat on the Board,” (citing Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 
404, 413, 418 (1982))).   
 28. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500–01 (1978).   
 29.  Weingarten, 420 U.S.  at 266–67 (emphasis added); Beth Israel Hosp., 437 U.S.  at 
501 (stating that as the nation’s appointed labor relations expert, “[t]he ultimate problem is 
the balancing of the conflicting legitimate interests.  The function of striking that balance to 
effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the 
Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited 
judicial review”). 
 30 NLRB v.  Int’l Ass’n of Bridge,434 U.S.  335, 351 (1978); see also Weingarten, 
420 U.S.  at 265–66.   
 31. Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, 434 U.S.  at 351; see also Weingarten, 420 U.S.  at 265–66 
(“To hold that the Board’s earlier decisions froze the development of this important aspect 
of the national labor law would misconceive the nature of administrative decisionmaking.”).   
 32. See, e.g., NLRB v.  Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 789 F.2d 188, 191 (3d Cir.  1986); Int’l 
All.  Of Theatrical Stage Emps.  & Moving Picture Mach.  Operators v.  NLRB, 779 F.2d 
552, 555 (9th Cir.  1985); Consol.  Papers, Inc.  v.  NLRB, 670 F.2d 754, 757 (7th Cir.  
1982); Latrobe Steel Co.  v.  NLRB, 630 F.2d 171, 176 (3d Cir.  1980). 
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Two examples suffice to demonstrate the Board’s recognized 
ability to change its mind on longstanding policy.  The first is the 
Board’s decision in John Deklewa & Sons.33  In Deklewa, the Board 
overruled a sixteen-year precedent governing pre-hire collective 
bargaining agreements in the construction industry that are authorized 
by Section 8(f) of the NLRA.
34
  A pre-hire agreement in the 
construction industry is one that can be signed even when the union 
does not enjoy majority support.
35
  Under the prior rule of R.J. Smith 
Construction Co.,
36
 a pre-hire agreement was subject to unilateral 
repudiation by an employer unless the union converted the agreement 
from a Section 8(f) non-majority agreement to a Section 9(a) majority 
agreement during the agreement’s term.37  In Deklewa, the Board 
abandoned that approach and instead ruled, inter alia, that Section 8(f) 
pre-hire agreements were enforceable and not subject to repudiation 
until they expired, and also that a Section 8(f) agreement could not 
convert to a majority agreement without obtaining an express 
recognition of the union’s majority status from the employer.38 
The change in policy in Deklewa was substantial, and R.J. Smith 
was a longstanding precedent at the time it was overruled.  Moreover, 
the Supreme Court had approved of the Board’s R.J. Smith policy on 
two occasions.
39
  Despite these considerations, courts nevertheless 
almost unanimously approved the Board’s entitlement to change its 
policy because they recognized that Section 8(f) was silent on the 
issues of repudiation by the employer and conversion to a Section 9(a) 
agreement, which therefore necessitated deference to the NLRB’s 
interpretation.
40
 
 
 33. 282 N.L.R.B.  1375 (1987), enforced sub nom., Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural & 
Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 3 v.  NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir.  1988).   
 34. Id.  at 1377.   
 35. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(f). 
 36. 191 N.L.R.B. No. 135 693, 695 (1971), enf. denied sub nom., Int’l Union of 
Operating Eng’rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186 (1973). 
 37. 282 N.L.R.B. No.  135 at 1378-79.   
 38. Id. at 1377-78. 
 39. See Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S. 260 (1983); NLRB v. Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, 
434 U.S. 335, 351 (1978).   
 40. See, e.g., NLRB v. Viola Indus.-Elevator Div., Inc., 979 F.2d 1384, 1393–95 (10th 
Cir.  1992); C.E.K. Indus. Mech. Contrs. v. NLRB, 921 F.2d 350, 357 (1st Cir. 1990); 
NLRB v. Bufco Corp., 899 F.2d 608, 609, 611 (7th Cir. 1990) DOC 13; NLRB v. W.L. 
Miller Co., 871 F.2d 745, 748 (8th Cir. 1989); Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. N. Cal. Dist. 
Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124, 1129-35 (9th Cir. 1988); Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, 
Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770, 776-79 (3d Cir. 
1988).  The Second Circuit has not explicitly ruled on the validity of Deklewa, but has cited 
to it without questioning its validity. See Empire State Carpenters Welfare Annuity & 
Apprentice Training Funds v. Conway Constr. of Ithaca, Inc., No. 07–CV–2259 (DRH) 
(ETB) 2012 WL 894407 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2012) (unpublished opinion) *7 n.2 (citing 
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Similarly, the Board changed its position four times in a twenty-
year period on how it would treat misrepresentations made during an 
election. In 1962, the Board articulated its initial policy in Hollywood 
Ceramics, stating that a substantial and material misrepresentation 
would provide grounds for setting aside an election.
41
  In 1977, the 
Board reversed that position in Shopping Kart Food Market and ruled 
that most misrepresentations made during an election would not 
provide grounds to set aside an election.
42
  The following year, in 
General Knit, the Board returned to the Hollywood Ceramics 
position.
43
  In 1982, in Midland National Life Insurance Co., the Board 
reversed yet again and re-adopted the rule of Shopping Kart.
44
  
Although circuit courts were quite critical of the Board’s vacillations, 
those courts nevertheless deferred to the Board’s entitlement to set 
labor policy on this issue.
45
 
To sustain a change in policy to restore the doctrine of Joy Silk, 
the Board will be required to show that the policy “is rational and 
consistent with the Act.”46  As part of making this showing, the Board 
 
Mulvaney Mech., Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local 38, 288 F.3d 491, 496 (2d 
Cir. 2002), vacated on other grounds, 538 U.S. 918 (2003); Benson v. Brower’s Moving & 
Storage, Inc., 907 F.2d 310, 315 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1990)).  The DC Circuit disapproved of the 
Board’s original position in R.J.  Smith. See Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 480 F.2d at 
1191.  Only two circuits failed to enforce the Board’s change of policy, and both did so not 
due to the merits of the Board’s position, but out of procedural concerns posed by the prior-
panel opinion rule, under which three-judge panels of a circuit must follow prior-panel 
opinions unless the panel opinions are overruled either by the Supreme Court or the en banc 
circuit court.  See Indus.  Turnaround Corp. v. NLRB, 115 F.3d 248, 254 (4th
 
Cir.  1997); 
Local Union 48 Sheet Metal Workers v. S.L. Pappas & Co., 106 F.3d 970, 975 (11th Cir. 
1997).  Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit opinion partially relies upon the Ninth Circuit’s 
Mesa Verde opinion in support of its own application of the prior panel rule to NLRB policy 
changes.  See Indus. Turnaround Corp., 115 F.3d at 254–55.  The en banc Ninth Circuit, 
however, rejected the view that the prior-panel rule was applicable in cases where the Board 
has changed its interpretation of the Act.  See Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1134–35 (“We hold, 
therefore, that if prior decisions of this court constitute only deferential review of NLRB 
interpretations of labor law, and do not decide that a particular interpretation of statute is the 
only reasonable interpretation, subsequent panels of this court are free to adopt new and 
reasonable NLRB decisions without the requirement of en banc review.”) (citations 
omitted).   
 41. 140 N.L.R.B. No. 36 221, 224 (1962).   
 42. 228 N.L.R.B. No. 190 1311, 1313-14 (1977).   
 43. 239 N.L.R.B. No. 101 619, 620 (1978).   
 44. 263 N.L.R.B. No. 24 127, 129 (1982).   
 45. NLRB. v. Best Products Co., Inc., 765 F.2d 903, 911 (9th Cir. 1985) (accepting 
Midland); NLRB v. Chi. Marine Containers, Inc., 745 F.2d 493, 498–500 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(accepting Midland); Hickman Harbor Serv., Div. of Flowers Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 739 
F.2d 214, 218 (6th Cir. 1984) (accepting Midland); NLRB. v. Mich. Rubber Products, Inc., 
738 F.2d 111, 116 (6th Cir. 1984) (accepting Midland); NLRB v. Monark Boat Co., 713 
F.2d 355, 360–61 (8th Cir. 1983) (accepting Midland); NLRB v. Rolligon Corp., 702 F.2d 
589, 592 (5th Cir. 1983) (accepting Midland). 
 46. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Sci., Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786 (1990) . 
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may be required to demonstrate that the change in policy is a 
reasonable effort to strike the balance among conflicting legitimate 
interests, based upon the Board’s cumulative experience and in light of 
changing industrial circumstances.
47
  This is a case that the Board 
surely can make with respect to restoring to Joy Silk as valid law. 
B. The History of How the Board Came to Abandon Joy Silk Strongly 
Suggests That It Was Abandoned by Mistake. 
The history of how the Board came to abandon the Joy Silk 
doctrine supports the conclusion that the Board can (and should) re-
adopt the doctrine.  The history strongly suggests that the Board 
abandoned Joy Silk through a mistake by, and possibly the improper 
conduct of, one of its attorneys.
 48
 
According to the most thorough examination of the history behind 
the case, Joy Silk was not initially abandoned by the Supreme Court or 
the NLRB, but rather by the NLRB’s Associate General Counsel, 
Dominick L. Manoli.
49
  After conducting an exhaustive review of the 
case files,
50
 Professors of Law Laura J. Cooper and Dennis R. Nolan 
concluded that during oral argument Associate General Counsel 
Manoli unilaterally changed positions for the Board during oral 
argument before the Supreme Court.  Put more bluntly, they conclude 
that Manoli misrepresented to the Court the actual state of affairs with 
respect to Board policy.
51
  The professors based this conclusion both on 
analysis of the oral argument transcript, but also by interviewing the 
surviving lawyers who participated in the argument.
52
  On the question 
of whether Manoli’s change of position was a mistake or a deliberate 
misstatement, the professors conclude that more likely Manoli 
deliberately misstated the NLRB’s position.53 
Why would a dedicated career agency attorney like Manoli do 
such a thing?   Professors Cooper and Nolan propose that Manoli 
adulterated Board doctrine as a way of evading a knotty question in the 
Board’s case law under the Joy Silk doctrine.54  The problem with 
which Manoli struggled was that under Joy Silk, as amended by Aaron 
 
 47. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 267 (1975). 
 48. Laura J. Cooper & Dennis R. Nolan, The Story of NLRB v. Gissel Packing: The 
Practical Limits of Paternalism, in LABOR LAW STORIES 219-21 (Catherine Fisk & Laura J. 
Cooper eds., 2005). 
 49. Id. 
 50. The key lawyer and witness, Associate General Counsel Manoli, died in 1980 and 
therefore could not provide his version of events.   Cooper & Nolan, supra note 48, at 219. 
 51. Cooper & Nolan, supra note 48, at 220–21.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Cooper & Nolan, supra note 48, at 219-221.   
 54. Id. at 221.   
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Brothers,
55
 an employer had the right to refuse to recognize a union 
claiming majority support from the workers only if the employer had a 
good faith doubt that the majority truly supported to the union.
56
  The 
difficult question that arose was what the NLRB did when an employer 
had no doubts about his employees’ support for the union, but simply 
preferred an election process.
57
  Under the Board’s way of looking at 
things, a preference for election did not necessarily constitute a good 
faith doubt about majority status, though it might.
58
  If the employer 
preferred an election to confirm the employees’ true wishes, that was 
permissible.  But if the employer had no true doubt as to the 
employees’ support for the union— as might arise if the employer were 
independently aware of the employees’ support— then that employer 
nevertheless might violate the Act by declining recognition and 
requesting an election. 
The Board’s supposedly meticulous parsing of the employer’s 
motives for refusing recognition gave rise to accusations that the Board 
was imposing a “magic words” requirement upon employers, requiring 
them to articulate their preference for an election with just the right 
nuance to avoid being found guilty of an unlawful refusal to bargain 
with the union in good faith.
59
  This, it was argued, violated the 
employer’s right to free speech.60 
The situation was further complicated by the distinct, but at that 
time unresolved, question of whether an employer who was ostensibly 
insisting upon an election was required to file its own petition for an 
election in order to prove its good faith.
61
  The lack of resolution of this 
question added to the sense at the time that employers who were 
presented with a showing of authorization cards from a union were in a 
legally treacherous position, in jeopardy of violating the NLRA with a 
wrong word or a single wrong step.
62
 
Professors Cooper and Nolan contend that while arguing before 
the Supreme Court, Manoli chose to avoid being ensnared by this 
 
 55. See 158 NLRB 1077, 1079 (1966). In Aaron Bros. Co., the NLRB amended the Joy 
Silk doctrine by specifying that the NLRB’s General Counsel held the burden of proof and 
persuasion to show an employer’s lack of good faith in refusing to recognize and bargain 
with a union claiming support from a majority of employees. Id. 
 56. See id. at 220-21.   
 57. Cooper & Nolan, supra note 48, at 220–21.   
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, 51, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 
(1969) (No. 573).    
 61. See Gissel, supra note 9, at 594–95 (stating that the Court would not address the 
issue).   
 62. Cooper & Nolan, supra note 48, at 221. 
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thicket with a simple denial that the thicket existed.
63
  Manoli 
suggested that commission of unfair labor practices was the sine qua 
non of the doctrine.
64
  Otherwise, no bad faith failure to bargain would 
be found, no matter the employer’s motive.65  Asked by one Justice 
whether this had always been the Board’s position, Manoli answered, 
“No, Your Honor, I think the Board has changed that.”66  But, 
Professors Cooper and Nolan conclude, it was Manoli who changed the 
Board’s position.67 
Professors Cooper and Nolan suggest that Manoli’s conduct may 
have crossed the line of what is appropriate and ethical for a 
government attorney by asserting as a fact that the agency no longer 
follows a precedent that it had not formally abandoned.
68
  Whatever 
can be said of the propriety of Manoli’s advocacy, it was poor agency 
process.  Such a unilateral decision means that the NLRB members did 
not participate in Manoli’s decision.  As a result, the expertise and 
experience of the agency’s principal members were not brought to bear 
on the wisdom or utility of the policy change.  The labor and 
management communities also did not have an opportunity to submit 
their views in advance of the change. 
The Board, in its Linden Lumber decision, ultimately did issue an 
opinion abandoning Joy Silk—two years after the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Gissel.
69
  Ironically, in rejecting Joy Silk, the Linden Lumber 
Board nevertheless acknowledged the accidental and erroneous nature 
of the original abandonment of the doctrine, noting that “[t]here was 
some question” as to whether the Supreme Court’s description of 
Board practice in the Gissel opinion was “entirely accurate.”70 
This history of Joy Silk’s inadvertent abandonment cannot inspire 
confidence that it was the right decision. To the contrary, in light of the 
need for additional deterrence in the present operation of the Act, 
discussed in Part III, infra, the abandonment of Joy Silk is a mistake 
that should be corrected. 
III.  THE CASE FOR RE-ADOPTING THE JOY SILK DOCTRINE 
A.   Joy Silk Is An Analytically Stronger Doctrine for Deterring the 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 
(1969) (No. 573). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Cooper & Nolan, supra note 48, at 220–21.   
 68. See Cooper & Nolan, supra note 48, at 220 n.60.   
 69. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 719, 720 (1971). 
 70. Id.   
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Commission of ULPs During Union Organizing Campaigns Than Is 
Gissel, the Doctrine That Replaced It. 
The primary reason for the Board to re-adopt the Joy Silk doctrine 
is because the Board’s forty-year experiment in administering the Act 
without Joy Silk demonstrates that the Act lacks the capacity to 
sufficiently deter the commission of ULPs without it. 
First, an analytical review of the Joy Silk doctrine demonstrates 
that it is the single most effective tool for deterring the commission of 
unfair labor practices during representational elections.  The doctrine 
directly negates an employer’s incentive to violate the law.  Employers 
who commit ULPs usually do so to avoid collectively bargaining with 
a union.
71
  Under Joy Silk, the Board would order an employer to 
recognize and bargain with a union upon showing that: (1) the union 
represented a majority of workers in an appropriate unit, (2) the union 
requested recognition, (3) the employer denied the request for 
recognition while lacking a good faith doubt as to the union’s majority 
status, and (4) the employer took action calculated to dissipate the 
union’s majority status.72  By making a bargaining order the 
unavoidable consequence of a ULP, this policy makes ULPs 
counterproductive even for the most stubbornly anti-union of 
employers.  By directly negating the incentive to commit ULPs, this 
policy does more to ensure elections that are free of ULPs than any 
other policy the NLRB could adopt. 
In the absence of enforcing Section 8(a)(5) with respect to 
uncertified, unrecognized unions, the NLRA lacks any alternative 
remedy to achieve effective deterrence to the commission of ULPs 
during organizing drives.  The Board’s only other remedies under the 
Act consist of cease and desist orders, reinstatement, backpay, or other 
affirmative relief, which usually takes the form of a notice.
73
  A cease 
and desist order, however, obviously lacks any measure of deterrence; 
it is the very definition of one free bite at the apple.  An award of 
reinstatement and backpay is make-whole relief; any deterrent effect it 
has is purely incidental.  Similarly, the issuance, posting, or reading of 
a notice has little value as a deterrent; as the saying goes, talk is cheap.  
Without the Joy Silk doctrine, therefore, the NLRA simply lacks any 
meaningful deterrent to the commission of ULPs.  This is a gaping hole 
in the statutory regime that radically undermines the real ability of 
 
 71. See, e.g., Gordon Lafer, Ph.D., American Rights At Work, Neither Free Nor Fair, 2 
(July 2007), http://www.jwj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Neither-Free-Nor-Fair-
FINAL.pdf (describing employer’s use of ULPs to defeat union organizing drives). 
 72. Joy Silk, supra note 8. 
 73. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). 
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employees to organize. 
So what about the Gissel doctrine that replaced Joy Silk?  Why 
does this doctrine fail to provide necessary deterrence?  The Gissel 
doctrine’s greatest weakness is that it is highly indeterminate.  As a 
result, it exerts highly indeterminate deterrence against the commission 
of ULPs. 
Gissel asks whether an employer’s ULPs have made the conduct 
of a fair election unlikely or impossible, even after the application of 
traditional remedies.  Because this inquiry asks a question about future 
events, courts have struggled with the speculative nature of the 
doctrine, demanding increasingly strict proof from NLRB’s General 
Counsel before affirming bargaining orders.
74
   
For instance, in the first years after Gissel was announced, circuit 
courts demanded “specific findings” and “detailed analysis” with 
respect to the following four factors before enforcing a Gissel 
bargaining order: 1.) the immediate and residual impact of the unfair 
labor practices on the election process; 2.) the possibility of holding a 
fair election in terms of any continuing effect of misconduct; 3.) the 
likelihood of recurring misconduct; and, 4.) the potential effectiveness 
of ordinary remedies.
75
  By the late 1990s, those factors had doubled in 
number, and agency guidance highlighted no fewer than eight factors 
that must be addressed to support a Gissel bargaining order, including 
hard-to-address categories such as the likelihood of future recurrence 
of ULPs and the impact of events that occurred following the 
administrative hearing from which the bargaining order first issued.
76
 
Several circuit courts require the Board to address two additional 
considerations as well, such as explaining why traditional remedies are 
not adequate and showing an explicit causal connection between the 
ULPs and the inability to hold an election.
77
 
Gissel’s indeterminacy is inherent to the doctrine.  It arises from 
the fact that the doctrine is not clearly based in any specific text of the 
Act.  Rather, Gissel is founded in the NLRB’s power under Section 
 
 74. See infra Notes 78-79. 
 75. See, e.g., Peerless of Am., Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1118 (7th Cir. 1973) 
(“[T]he Board must make ‘specific findings’ as to the immediate and residual impact of the 
unfair labor practices on the election process and that the Board must make ‘a detailed 
analysis’ assessing the possibility of holding a fair election in terms of any continuing effect 
of misconduct, the likelihood of recurring misconduct, and the potential effectiveness of 
ordinary remedies.”); New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 491, 494–95 (7th Cir.  
1971) (holding that the NLRB did not “meet the ‘precise analysis’ required by Gissel”); 
NLRB v. Kostel Corp., 440 F.2d 347, 353 (7th Cir. 1971). 
 76. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 99-8, Guideline Memorandum Concerning Gissel, 4–5 
(Nov. 10, 1999). 
 77. Id. at 5. 
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10(c) of the Act to issue “affirmative relief” that includes a bargaining 
order under certain difficult-to-specify conditions.
78
  The inquiry at the 
heart of the Gissel doctrine is whether the employer has committed 
ULPs that make the conduct of a fair election unlikely.  Other than by 
defining ULPs in general, the statutory text provides no clues for how 
this inquiry should be answered.
79
  Gissel doctrine distinguishes 
between Category I cases, which involve outrageous and pervasive 
ULPs, and Category II cases, which involve less serious ULPs.
80
  This 
distinction is found nowhere in the Act, and no objective basis exists to 
distinguish between Category I and Category II cases. 
Gissel doctrine utilizes a further classification of “hallmark” 
ULPs.
81
  Again, no statutory basis for this category exists, and 
confusion persists regarding what qualifies as a “hallmark” violation.  
For instance, some courts have an ongoing disagreement with the 
NLRB over whether a promise of benefits is a “hallmark” infraction.82  
The Memorandum on Gissel orders published by the General Counsel 
of the NLRB also notes that circuit courts have questioned the viability 
of Gissel orders when the case only involves violations of Section 
8(a)(1).
83
  Members of the NLRB have admitted that “there can be few 
‘per se’ rules” for determining when a bargaining order under Gissel is 
warranted, and that the decision has been perplexing and confounding 
for the NLRB almost since the inception of Gissel.
84
  This confusion is 
also attributable to the Gissel doctrine’s lack of an express foundation 
in the text of the Act.  As a result of this lack of clear connection to the 
statutory text, it should come as no surprise that Gissel is both 
indeterminate and faces resistance by circuit courts. 
 
 78. NLRB V. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 613 (1969); General Stencils, Inc., 195 
N.L.R.B. 1109, 1112 (1972) (Chairman Miller, dissenting) enforcement denied 472 F.2d 170 
(2d Cir. 1972) (Board members have admitted that there can be “few per se rules” for 
determining when a bargaining order under Gissel, noting that presence of “infinitely 
various circumstances” that should influence the analysis).   
 79. The provision of the NLRA defining employer ULPs is 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)-(5). 
The provision establishing the election process is 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B), which says only 
that the election shall be by “secret ballot” but otherwise contains no standards for whether 
an election is fair or not. 
 80. See Guideline Memorandum Concerning Gissel, supra note 76, at 4–5. 
 81. As explained by the Board, “hallmark” violations are “highly coercive violations 
that include plant closure or threat of plant closure, conferral of benefits, discharge, or threat 
of discharge, and the use of force in an attempt to discourage union activity.” Cogburn 
Healthcare Ctr., Inc., 335 NLRB 1397, 1403 n.14 (2001).  In Cogburn Healthcare, the 
Board appeared to credit the Second Circuit Court of Appeals with defining the term 
“hallmark violation” in NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, 632 F.2d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 1980).  See id.  
 82.  See id. at 5. 
 83. For a definition of a § 8(a)(1) violation, see Guideline Memorandum Concerning 
Gissel, supra note 76. 
 84. General Stencils, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. at 1111. 
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For those who would assert that the flaws of Gissel somehow are 
not inherent to the doctrine itself, they must contend with the fact that 
circuit courts identified all the difficulties in the Gissel proof model in 
the first years of the doctrine’s existence. Within two years of Gissel’s 
introduction, circuit courts from the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals issued decisions 
criticizing the NLRB’s failure to take seriously the difficult evidentiary 
showing necessitated by the Gissel proof model.
85
  These cases 
highlighted all of the problems that have dogged the Gissel doctrine 
throughout its existence.
86
  Circuit courts identified these fundamental 
objections to Gissel almost immediately after the doctrine was 
created.
87
  Yet as the doctrine became more familiar to circuit courts, it 
did not become more accepted.  Over twenty years later, in 1999, the 
General Counsel of the NLRB admitted that rather than becoming more 
accepting of Gissel with time, circuit courts had only become more 
stubborn in their reluctance to enforce bargaining orders under Gissel.
88
 
 
 85. Clark’s Gamble Corp. v. NLRB, 422 F.2d 845, 847 (6th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Gen. 
Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894, 905 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J.) (enforcement of bargaining 
order denied); NLRB v. American Cable Systems, Inc., 427 F.2d 446, 449 (5th Cir. 1970) 
(same); Fremont Newspapers, Inc. v. NLRB, 436 F.2d 665, 673 (8th Cir. 1970) 
(enforcement of bargaining order denied); New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 491, 
494-95 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that the NLRB did not “meet the ‘precise analysis’ required 
by Gissel”); NLRB v. Hart Beverage Co., 445 F.2d 415, 421 (8th Cir. 1971) (enforcement of 
bargaining order denied); Gen. Steel Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 1350, 1356-57 (4th 
Cir. 1971) (enforcement of bargaining order denied); NLRB. v. Miller Trucking Serv., Inc., 
445 F.2d 927, 932 (10th Cir. 1971) (enforcement of bargaining order denied); NLRB v. 
Sayers Printing Co., 453 F.2d 810, 818 (8th Cir. 1971) (enforcement of bargaining order 
denied); NLRB v. World Carpets of N.Y., Inc., 463 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 86. For instance, a major point of contention in these cases was the Board’s inability to 
prove convincingly that a fair election is impossible, which is the basic speculative proof 
problem at the heart of the Gissel doctrine.  See World Carpets of N.Y., 463 F.2d at 62; New 
Alaska Dev. Corp., 441 F.2d at 494–95; Hart Beverage Co., 445 F.2d at 421; Miller 
Trucking Serv., 445 F.2d at 932. A second problem was the Board’s inability to distinguish 
objectively the types of ULPs that make a bargaining order necessary from those that do not.  
See Gen. Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d at 905; Sayers Printing Co., 453 F.2d at 818.  Perhaps the 
most intransigent problem arose from the circuit court’s discomfort with enforcing a 
bargaining order based upon a factual determination made several years in the past that a 
fair election was not possible, without any analysis of whether an election would be 
impossible in the present.  See Clark’s Gamble Corp., 422 F.2d at 847; Am. Cable Sys., Inc., 
427 F.2d at 449; Gen. Steel Products, Inc., 445 F.2d at 1356. 
 87. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in General Steel Products, Inc., arose from a 
case that was before the Supreme Court with the Gissel case.  On remand from the Supreme 
Court, the NLRB re-issued a bargaining order under the new Gissel doctrine only to have 
the Fourth Circuit refuse enforcement based largely the Board’s failure to consider changes 
in circumstances that occurred over the many years while the case was under judicial 
review.  See Gen. Steel Products, Inc., 445 F.2d at 1356.   
 88. See Guideline Memorandum Concerning Gissel, supra note 76, at 1 (noting that 
“[o]ver the years, some of the circuit courts of appeal considering whether to enforce Board 
Gissel orders have differed with the Board’s approach”).  Specific examples of the 
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Another significant problem with Gissel is that the Second, Third, 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits regard a 
Gissel bargaining order as an “extraordinary remedy.”89  An 
extraordinary remedy, by definition, is one that is rarely entered; for 
that reason, Gissel cannot be expected to offer significant deterrence.  
To the contrary, because the Gissel doctrine is granted only in 
extraordinary cases, Gissel actually provides incentives to employers to 
commit ULPs during Board-supervised elections, because it sends the 
message that, except in extraordinary circumstances, the employer’s 
illegal conduct will accomplish its intended aim. 
  
 
differences include the fact that the NLRB typically refuses employer requests to reopen the 
record to offer evidence of changes in circumstances following the violations that 
precipitated the Gissel bargaining order, despite the fact that “[t]he courts are almost 
unanimous in requiring that the Board consider the relevance of changed circumstances.” Id. 
at 13 n.48 (citing Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 1166, 1170–72 (1998)).  
Another point of contention identified was the fact that “several of the courts of appeals 
have not accepted the Board’s view of these [8(a)(1)] violations as “hallmark” and declined 
to enforce the Board’s decisions.” Id. at 14. 
 89. NLRB v. Goya Foods, 525 F.3d 1117, 1129 (11th Cir. 2008); NLRB v. U.S.A. 
Polymer Corp., 272 F.3d 289, 297 (5th Cir. 2001); Exch. Bank v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 60, 63 
(6th Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Apple Tree Chevrolet, Inc., 671 F.2d 838, 841 n.5 (4th Cir. 1982); 
NLRB v. Century Moving & Storage, Inc., 683 F.2d 1087, 1093 (7th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. K 
& K Gourmet Meats, Inc., 640 F.2d 460, 470 (3d Cir. 1981); Grandee Beer Distribs., Inc. v. 
NLRB, 630 F.2d 928, 934 (2d Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Ship Shape Maint. Co., 474 F.2d 434, 
442–43 (1972). 
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B.  Empirical Evidence Shows that Without the Joy Silk Doctrine, the 
NLRA Lacks Sufficient Deterrence Against the Commission of ULPs 
during Representation Elections. 
The foregoing section made the analytical case that Joy Silk more 
effectively deterred the commission of ULPs during representation 
elections than Gissel.  This section will show that the empirical record 
also resoundingly supports that conclusion.  Figure 2, infra, broadly 
illustrates the consequences of the NLRB’s abandonment of the Joy 
Silk doctrine. 
Figure 2
90
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the increase in the number of illegal discharge and 
intimidation ULP charges filed following the abandonment of the Joy Silk 
doctrine.  
 
 
 90. Data for Illegal Intimidation ULPs, Illegal Discharge ULPs taken from Table 2 of 
the NLRB’s Annual Reports from 1959 to 2009.  See 24 NLRB ANN. REP. 163 (1959) 
through 74 NLRB Ann. Rep. 95 (2009).  Data on conclusive representational and collective 
bargaining elections from Chart 11 and Table 13 of the Annual Report of the NLRB volume 
26 (1961); from Chart 12 and Table 13 from volumes 27 through 29 (1962-1964); from the 
unnumbered Chart on page 15 and Table 11A from volumes 35 and 36 (1970-1971); and 
Table 11A and Chart 12 of the Annual Reports of the NLRB volumes 30 through 34 (1965-
1969) and 37 through 74 (1972-2009).  See 29 NLRB ANN. REP. 20 (1964) to74 NLRB 
Ann. Rep. 13 (2009). 
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Figure 2 displays the incidence of three types of filings with the 
NLRB from 1959 to 2009.  The blue line shows the number of ULP 
charges alleging violations of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, which are 
referred to generally herein as “Illegal Discharges.”91  The purple line 
shows the number of ULP charges alleging violations of Section 
8(a)(1), which are referred to generally here as “Illegal Intimidation” 
charges.
92
  The red line shows the number of conclusive elections 
conducted each year by the Board.
93
 
As Figure 2 shows, the broad consequences of the NLRB’s 
abandonment of Joy Silk are that Illegal Discharge ULPs increased by 
125% from 8,122 to 18,313, and Illegal Intimidation charges increased 
by over 525%, rising from 947 in 1969 to 6,493 in 1981.  By contrast, 
after rising steadily through the 1960s, the number of conclusive 
elections flattened to virtually no growth following the abandonment of 
Joy Silk.  In the 1980s, the number of elections fell precipitously during 
the opening years of the decade and have trended steadily downward 
since.  In sum, Figure 2 lays an empirical foundation for arguing that, 
in abandoning the Joy Silk doctrine, the NLRB relinquished its capacity 
to effectively deter the commission of ULPs during union organizing 
campaigns. 
One might ask whether employers did not actually increase their 
 
 91. Violations under Section 8(a)(3) mostly consist of allegations of the illegal 
discharge of union supporters and are referred to throughout as “Illegal Discharges.”  These 
charges are uncommon between incumbent unions and unionized employers because 
disputes between these parties over a discharged employee will mostly likely be addressed 
through the collective bargaining agreement’s grievance mechanisms.  Consequently, illegal 
discharge allegations are likely to arise between unions and unorganized companies and thus 
will be heavily centered on organizing campaigns. 
 92. The label “Illegal Intimidation” used throughout this article refers to pure 8(a)(1) 
ULP charges.  Such charges are pure in the sense that they are not dependent on any other 
section of the Act to describe the violation; they allege violations § 8(a)(1) but do not allege 
a violation of any other section of the Act.  Such 8(a)(1)s usually consist of threats, 
employer surveillance of employee activity, or interrogations.  This category may also 
include allegations of discrimination that are not violations of Section 8(a)(3) because the 
employer is retaliating against the exercise of Section 7 rights but without a motive related 
to an employee’s association with a union. 
 93. The NLRB recorded percentages of union victories in a Chart 12 in its Annual 
Reports since the 1960s.  In the 1975, however, the Board altered the way it presented this 
statistic.  See 40 NLRB ANN. REP. 15 (1975).  Prior to 1975, the Board measured union 
victories as a percentage of “collective bargaining elections” in which unions were selected 
as the exclusive representative.  See, e.g. 39 NLRB ANN. REP. 15 (1974).  In 1975, the 
Board changed the statistic to measure the percentage of “representation elections” in which 
unions were selected.  See 40 NLRB ANN. REP. 15. “Collective bargaining elections” 
consist of elections held pursuant to RC and RM petitions.  See 22 NLRB ANN. REP. 172 
(1957) “Representation elections” consist of RC, RM, and RD petitions, that is, petitions 
filed by unions, by an employer, and for decertification, respectively.  See 40 NLRB ANN. 
REP. at 197.   
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commission of ULPs at all, but rather that unions merely increased 
their incidence of filing ULPs.  However, this explanation is fatally 
flawed.  To begin, both Joy Silk and Gissel provide relatively equal 
incentives to unions to file ULPs against employers during organizing 
drives.  Unions increase their chances of obtaining relief under either 
Gissel or Joy Silk by filing charges against employers.
94
  The change in 
rules, therefore, would not explain why unions began filing ULPs more 
frequently after 1969. 
Even more fatal to the theory is that the NLRB’s recorded merit 
factor for ULPs did not appreciably change from 1970 to 1980, when 
the incidence of ULPs exploded upward.
95
  The merit factor was 34.2 
in 1970, 35.7 in 1980, 40.7 in 1990, and 39.9 in 2000.
96
  The 
consistency in the merit factor tells us that, while the frequency of 
filing ULP charges increased over this period, that increase was 
proportionate to the increase in the commission of ULPs; that is to say, 
unions filed ULPs at the same rate relative to the commission of ULPs 
after the adoption of the Gissel rule as they before it.  The relative rate 
at which unions filed ULPs did not change, and as a result we can be 
confident that the increase in the commission of employer ULPs was 
real. 
It also might be questioned whether the increases can be explained 
by increases in the size of the workforce.  However, as Figure 3, infra, 
demonstrates, from 1959 to 1969 the rate of increase in the filing of 
Illegal Discharge and Intimidation ULPs was slower than the rate of 
growth of the work force.  For this reason, the incidence of ULP filings 
per 100,000 wage earners actually decreases through the time period, 
and the trend line projected from the data during this time period is 
downward sloping.  By contrast, from 1970 to 1980, the rate of 
increase in the filing of Illegal Intimidation and Discharge ULP charges 
proceeds considerably faster than the rate of growth of the work force, 
resulting in a dramatic upward slope in the data and projected trend 
lines derived from that data.  As shown in Figure 3, the rate of Illegal 
Intimidation charges increased from 1.4 per 100,000 wage earners in 
1969, to seven per 100,000 in 1981.  Similarly, the rate of Illegal 
 
 94. See Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1264 (1949) (citing the employer’s 
unlawful conduct as a factor showing an employer’s bad faith); Aaron Bros. Co., 158 
N.L.R.B. 1077, 1079 (1966) (citing substantial ULPs as signifying an employer’s bad faith); 
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969) (citing the “extensiveness of an 
employer's unfair practices” as a relevant factor for issuing a bargaining order). 
 95. The NLRB’s merit factor is the percentage of cases in which the NLRB finds merit 
to the ULPs charge either by issuing complaints or by working out settlements prior to 
issuing complaints.  See 45 NLRB ANN. REP. 10 (1980). 
 96. See 45 NLRB ANN. REP. 10 (1980); 55 NLRB ANN. REP. 10 (1990); 65 NLRB 
ANN. REP. 9 (2000).   
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Discharge ULPs increased from 11.7 per 100,000 wage earners in 
1969, to 20.1 in 1980.  The data demonstrates that the rate of increase 
in these ULPs that occurred following the abandonment of Joy Silk was 
independent of, and much faster than, concurrent increases in the size 
of the workforce. 
 
FIGURE 3
97
 
 Another question pertains to what happened within the data 
following the peaks of 1980 and 1981 when the incidence of ULPs 
began to fall.  Did something happen to allow the Board to re-assert 
control over the commission of ULPs in the 1980s? 
The answer, unfortunately, is no.  Instead, as shown in Figure 4 
 
 97. Data for Illegal Intimidation ULPs, Illegal Discharge ULPs taken from Table 2 of 
the NLRB’s Annual Reports from 1959 to 2009.  See 24 NLRB ANN. REP. 163 (1959) 
through 74 NLRB ANN. REP. 95 (2009).  Data on conclusive representational and collective 
bargaining elections from Chart 11 and Table 13 of the Annual Report of the NLRB volume 
26 (1961); from Chart 12 and Table 13 from volumes 27 through 29 (1962-1964); from the 
unnumbered Chart on page 15 and Table 11A from volumes 35 and 36 (1970-1971); and 
Table 11A and Chart 12 of the Annual Reports of the NLRB volumes 30 through 34 (1965-
1969) and 37 through 74 (1972-2009).  See 29 NLRB Ann. Rep. 20 (1964) to74 NLRB 
ANN. REP. 13 (2009).  Worker population data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Department of Labor, on Nonfarm Wage Earners.   
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below, the primary driver of ULPs—NLRB elections—began rapidly 
falling after 1981.  Figure 4 shows the data for the number of 
conclusive collective bargaining and representation elections conducted 
by the NLRB from 1959 to 2009.  Using a linear regression based upon 
the data from the Joy Silk era, Figure 4 displays the trend line projected 
into the years following the Board’s abandonment of Joy Silk in 1969. 
 
 
FIGURE 4
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As can be seen, the number of elections rose steadily through the 
1960s.  In the 1970s, as ULPs dramatically increased, the trend 
flattened to virtually no growth.  In the 1980s, the number of elections 
fell precipitously during the opening years of the decade and have 
 
 98. Data for Illegal Intimidation ULPs, Illegal Discharge ULPs taken from Table 2 of 
the NLRB’s Annual Reports from 1959 to 2009. See 24 NLRB ANN. REP. 163 (1959) 
through 74 NLRB ANN. REP. 95 (2009).  Data on conclusive representational and 
collective bargaining elections from Chart 11 and Table 13 of the Annual Report of the 
NLRB volume 26 (1961); from Chart 12 and Table 13 from volumes 27 through 29 (1962-
1964); from the unnumbered Chart on page 15 and Table 11A from volumes 35 and 36 
(1970-1971); and Table 11A and Chart 12 of the Annual Reports of the NLRB volumes 30 
through 34 (1965-1969) and 37 through 74 (1972-2009).  See 29 NLRB ANN. REP. 20 
(1964) to74 NLRB ANN. REP. 13 (2009). 
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trended steadily downward since.  As with ULPs, this Figure 4 shows 
that something occurred after 1969 to alter the trajectory of the trend 
with respect to representation elections that caused the number of 
elections to stop growing and then decrease steadily.  Furthermore, the 
drop off in the number of elections matches precisely with the drop off 
in the number of ULPs.  This tandem movement is clearly visible in 
Figure 1, supra.  In addition, as is discussed infra, the tandem 
movement can be demonstrated statistically. 
The other way we know that the NLRB did not re-acquire control 
over the commission of ULPs in the early 1980s is that the rate of 
ULPs per election did not decrease at all in the 1980s.  Rather, even 
though the absolute number of ULPs decreased during this time, the 
number of ULPs per election continued to increase.  This trend can be 
seen, in Figure 5, infra. 
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Figure 5
99
 
 
Figure 5 shows that the number of Illegal Intimidation and 
 
 99. Data for Illegal Intimidation ULPs, Illegal Discharge ULPs taken from Table 2 of 
the NLRB’s Annual Reports from 1959 to 2009. See 24 NLRB ANN. REP. 163 (1959) 
through 74 NLRB ANN. REP. 95 (2009).  Data on conclusive representational and collective 
bargaining elections from Chart 11 and Table 13 of the Annual Report of the NLRB volume 
26 (1961); from Chart 12 and Table 13 from volumes 27 through 29 (1962-1964); from the 
unnumbered Chart on page 15 and Table 11A from volumes 35 and 36 (1970-1971); and 
Table 11A and Chart 12 of the Annual Reports of the NLRB volumes 30 through 34 (1965-
1969) and 37 through 74 (1972-2009).  See 29 NLRB ANN. REP. 20 (1964) to74 NLRB 
ANN. REP. 13 (2009). 
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Discharge ULPs filed per conclusive election did not consistently 
decrease in the 1980s.  Instead, after peaking in the early 1980s, both 
rates settled into a new equilibrium at a much higher level than existed 
prior to 1969.  After Joy Silk was abandoned, the average number of 
Illegal Intimidation charges per election increased by a factor of nearly 
ten, from 0.11 in the period from 1964 to 1969, to 1.08 in the period 
following 1980.  The average number of Illegal Discharge ULPs 
increased by a factor of three, from 1.00 per election in the period from 
1959 to 1969, to 3.2 per election during the period from 1981 to 2009. 
The relationship between the number of elections and the 
incidence of Illegal Discharge and Intimidation ULPs is consistent 
throughout the period from 1959 to 2009.  As seen in Figure 1, supra, 
ULPs and elections moved in tandem prior to 1969 and from 1979 
onward.  The only period during which the trends in the numbers of 
elections and ULPs diverge is the ten-year period immediately 
following the abandonment of Joy Silk, when ULPs increased 
explosively upward while elections stagnated.
100
 
The relationship between elections and ULPs can be shown 
statistically by calculating the correlation coefficient between the 
incidence of ULPs and the incidence of elections.  A coefficient of 1 is 
a perfect correlation, while -1 is a perfectly inverted correlation.  A 
coefficient of 0 means no correlation, while 0.5 or below is considered 
a weak correlation. 
As Table 1 shows, ULPs are closely correlated to the number of 
elections, and the degree of correlation is very strong.  The correlation 
coefficient between Illegal Discharge ULPs and elections is 0.90 from 
1979 to 2009, and 0.89 from 1955 to 1969.  From 1970 to 1979, the 
correlation is inconsistent with the relationship during other time 
periods because Illegal Discharges rose dramatically while the number 
of elections stagnated.  This turmoil in the data produced a slightly 
negative correlation, as opposed to the strongly positive correlation that 
exists during the other periods observed. 
 
 
 100. See, supra, Figure 1. 
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TABLE 1
101
 
TABLE OF CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
Correlation between  
Illegal Discharges and Conclusive Elections 
Period Correlation Coefficient 
1955-1969 0.89 
1970-1979 -0.04 
1979-2009 0.90 
Correlation between  
Illegal Intimidation and Conclusive Elections 
Period Correlation Coefficient 
1964-1969 0.15 
1970-1979 -0.12 
1979-2009 0.84 
 
The same pattern is exhibited with Illegal Intimidation charges.  
The correlation coefficient between Illegal Intimidation charges and 
elections is 0.84 during the period 1979 to 2009.  There is almost no 
correlation between Illegal Intimidation charges and elections from 
1964 to 1969.  This discrepancy may be due to the very small sample 
size—only six years—or it is possible that no correlation existed 
between these sets of events prior to the abandonment of Joy Silk.  As 
with Illegal Discharges, the correlation turns slightly negative during 
the 1970s.  Ten years after the adoption of Gissel, however, the 
correlation between the two types of events is strong, with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.84.  It is also worth noting that the incidence of Illegal 
Discharges and Illegal Intimidation are closely correlated.  From 1979 
to 2009, the correlation coefficient between them is 0.94. 
The correlations presented in Table 1 support two insights.  First, 
the ULPs themselves are connected to elections.  This connection is 
critical because Joy Silk and Gissel both are rules that govern in the 
context of union organizing.
102
  If the ULPs themselves were not 
 
 101. Data for Illegal Intimidation ULPs, Illegal Discharge ULPs taken from Table 2 of 
the NLRB’s Annual Reports from 1959 to 2009. See 24 NLRB ANN. REP. 163 (1959) 
through 74 NLRB ANN. REP. 95 (2009).  Data on conclusive representational and collective 
bargaining elections from Chart 11 and Table 13 of the Annual Report of the NLRB volume 
26 (1961); from Chart 12 and Table 13 from volumes 27 through 29 (1962-1964); from the 
unnumbered Chart on page 15 and Table 11A from volumes 35 and 36 (1970-1971); and 
Table 11A and Chart 12 of the Annual Reports of the NLRB volumes 30 through 34 (1965-
1969) and 37 through 74 (1972-2009).  See 29 NLRB ANN. REP. 20 (1964) to74 NLRB 
ANN. REP. 13 (2009). 
 102. See Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 580-90 (describing the factual setting of the 
four consolidated cases arising from union organizing campaigns); Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 
N.L.R.B. at 1264 (case arose from a union organizing campaign). 
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clearly connected to organizing, then the abandonment of Joy Silk and 
its proposed re-adoption would be unlikely to affect them.  These 
ULPs, however, are obviously tied to elections and union organizing. 
Second, the most plausible account of the correlation is that the 
elections are causing the ULPs.  Causation cannot run the other way.  
Consider how elections happen.  An NLRB election requires a question 
concerning representation,
103
 which in turn requires the presence of a 
party, almost always a labor organization, wishing to serve as an 
exclusive representative.  While unorganized employees have the right 
to file ULP charges against their employer without a union’s 
involvement,
104
 the act of filing charges will not cause the formation of 
a labor organization, and therefore does not induce elections for 
representation.  Could a third factor exist that simultaneously causes 
both union organizing drives and separately causes ULPs in a way 
where the two are not related?  The existence of such a factor is highly 
doubtful—there is no evidence to date suggesting such a factor.  The 
evidence supports the explanation that union organizing drives induce 
NLRB representative elections and concurrently incite Illegal 
Discharge and Intimidation ULPs. 
Beyond the statistical evidence presented here, the link between 
Illegal Discharge and Intimidation ULPs is further supported by a host 
of survey studies and other empirical inquiries that have been 
conducted since the 1980s.  Many surveys conducted since the 
explosion of ULPs in the 1970s confirm that, in fact, the NLRB 
election process for the past thirty years has been suffused with the 
commission of ULPs. 
A 2009 comprehensive report on the commission of ULPs during 
representation elections found that from January 1, 1999, through 
December 31, 2003: 
[E]mployers threatened to close the plant in 57% of elections, 
discharged workers in 34%, and threatened to cut wages and 
beneﬁts in 47% of elections. Workers were forced to attend anti-
union one-on-one sessions with a supervisor at least weekly in two-
thirds of elections. In 63% of elections employers used supervisor 
one-on-one meetings to interrogate workers about who they or 
other workers supported, and in 54% used such sessions to threaten 
workers.
105
  
 
 103. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c). 
 104. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.2 (providing that any person may file a ULP charge). 
 105. Kate Bronfenbrenner, Economic Policy Institute, No Holds Barred: The 
Intensification of Employer Opposition to Organization, Economic Policy Institute briefing 
paper #235, 2 (May 20, 2009), 
http://epi.3cdn.net/edc3b3dc172dd1094f_0ym6ii96d.pdf. 
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In sum, this report concludes that coercive conduct occurs in the 
majority of Board-supervised elections. 
Similar results are reported by Dr. Gordon Lafer, who, reviewing 
data from 2004, concluded “that one out of every 17 eligible voters was 
ﬁred or otherwise financially penalized for supporting unions.”106  Dr. 
Lafer’s conclusion matches the findings of Harvard Law Professor Paul 
Weiler in the 1980s, who reported that “for every twenty recorded 
votes for unions in elections in 1980, and for every ten votes in 1985, 
there was one case of an illegally discharged worker obtaining 
reinstatement through the office of the NLRB.”107  In sum, the evidence 
shows a consistent track record where very high levels of employer 
coercion permeate the Board election process. 
This record provides a strong rationale for re-adopting Joy Silk as 
a rational step to address the clearly insufficient deterrence in the 
extant statutory regime.  The history of the Act prior to the 
abandonment of Joy Silk demonstrates that it is possible for the Board 
to conduct large numbers of elections with significantly lower numbers 
of ULPs.
108
  Indeed, in light of its experience prior to 1969, the Board 
should set a target of reducing ULP filings to no more than one Illegal 
Discharge per election and no more than one Illegal Intimidation per 
every ten elections.  To reduce ULPs sufficiently to meet these targets, 
however, the Board must administer and interpret the Act in a way that 
exerts greater deterrence.  Re-adopting Joy Silk would be a logical 
means to achieve these goals. 
Re-adopting Joy Silk is the best means to increase deterrence for 
several reasons.  First, the rate of commission of ULPs was lower 
under the Act while Joy Silk was in place.  It therefore is logical to 
conclude that the Joy Silk doctrine could be important to achieve these 
levels again.  Second, in Linden Lumber, the Board justified the 
abandonment of Joy Silk as a matter of discretionary policy to reflect 
the Board’s preference for having representational questions resolved 
through elections.
109
  To advance that preference, the Linden Lumber 
Board chose to stop enforcing Section 8(a)(5) in cases where the 
representative had been designated but not certified or voluntarily 
recognized.
110
  Given the higher ULP commission rates and therefore 
 
 106. Gordon Lafer, Ph.D., American Rights At Work, Neither Free Nor Fair, 32 (July 
2007), http://www.jwj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Neither-Free-Nor-Fair-FINAL.pdf.   
 107. Paul C. Weiler, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FURTHER OF LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 112 (1990).   
 108. See Figure 1 and Figure 5, supra. 
 109.  Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 721 (1971).   
 110. See id. 
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insufficient deterrence now,
111
 this policy choice is no longer justified.  
Simply stated, the need for additional deterrence militates in favor of 
Board enforcement of Section 8(a)(5) in all circumstances when it is 
violated—even when it is violated with respect to representatives who 
are designated by a majority of employees, but not certified by the 
Board or voluntarily recognized by an employer.  History has rendered 
its verdict that the decision to simply not enforce the Act in these 
circumstances is a luxury the Board cannot afford.  The Board should 
therefore return to enforcing Section 8(a)(5) when employers violate 
the subsection with respect to designated but uncertified and 
unrecognized representatives; that is, it should re-adopt the doctrine of 
Joy Silk. 
C.   Strong Evidence Supports the Conclusion that the Abandonment of 
Joy Silk Caused the Massive Increase in ULPs Following 1969. 
The prior argument is not necessarily predicated upon the 
conclusion that the abandonment of Joy Silk caused the increase in 
ULPs that occurred after 1969.  Rather, it rests simply upon the 
observation that the significant increase in commission of ULPs 
following 1969 points to a lack of sufficient deterrence in the Act.  In 
light of the need for additional deterrence, it would be a rational and 
logical step for the Board to enforce Section 8(a)(5) when employers 
violate it with respect to designated, but uncertified and unrecognized, 
representatives, and instead to re-adopt Joy Silk as a means of 
attempting to exert more deterrence against the commission of ULPs. 
An even more powerful rationale for re-adopting Joy Silk is 
possible, however. Powerful evidence exists to support the conclusion 
that the abandonment of Joy Silk caused the increase in the commission 
of ULPs that followed. The proof of this conclusion will be made as 
follows. First, the trends the filing of ULPs before and after the 
abandonment of Joy Silk are compared in order to demonstrate that the 
trends changed definitively after 1969. Second, the timing of increases 
in the ULPs is examined. Third, alternative explanations for the 
increase will be considered. 
Proof that Joy Silk caused the increase in the commission of ULPs 
begins by comparing trend lines both before and after the abandonment 
of Joy Silk.  Figure 5, infra, displays the total number of charges 
alleging Illegal Intimidation from 1964 to 1969. Unfortunately, no data 
for Illegal Intimidation charges is available in the years preceding 
1964.
112
  Using a linear regression based upon the data from the Joy 
 
 111. See Figure 1 and Figure 5, supra. 
 112. Statistics for the filing of pure 8(a)(1) charges are not available from 1951 to 1964, 
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Silk era, Figure 6, infra, displays the trend line projected into the years 
following the Board’s abandonment of Joy Silk in 1969. 
 
FIGURE 6
113
 
 
As can be seen, the trend line based upon the data from 1964 to 
1969 predicts that, in the ten years following 1969, Illegal Intimidation 
charges will not exceed 1000.  Moreover, if the trend continued 
 
the first year that the NLRB began tracking this category of ULP.  The NLRB did record 
pure 8(a)(1) charges in 1949 and 1950, however, when 350 and 352 charges were filed.  See 
14 N.L.R.B. 159 (1949); 15 N.L.R.B. 222 (1950).  The inclusion of these data points barely 
alters the plot of the projected trend line extracted from the Joy Silk era and does not 
materially alter the conclusions offered here that the commission of Illegal Intimidation 
charges increased in an unprecedented and dramatic manner following the abandonment of 
Joy Silk.   
 113. Data for Illegal Intimidation ULPs taken from Table 2 of the NLRB’s Annual 
Reports from 1959 to 2009.  See 24 NLRB ANN. REP. 163 (1959) through 74 NLRB ANN. 
REP. 95 (2009).  The line labeled “Linear” is a projection of a trend line derived from the 
data from 1959 to 1969 only. 
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without deviation through 2009, the Illegal Intimidation charges would 
not have exceeded 1,500 during the entire period. 
In reality, however, the trends from 1964 to 1969 did not continue 
following the Board’s abandonment of Joy Silk.  As Figure 7, infra, 
shows, Illegal Intimidation ULP charges increased dramatically 
following 1969. 
 
Figure 7
114
 
 
 
Figure 7 shows the record of actual Illegal Intimidation ULP 
charges filed from 1964 to 2009.  It also shows the trend line from the 
data from 1964 to 1969 previously shown in Figure 6 above, along 
with the trend line derived from the data from 1970 to 1980.  Following 
the Board’s abandonment of Joy Silk, Illegal Intimidation charges rose 
with unprecedented speed.  Rather than requiring thirty years to reach 
1,500 charges, as predicted by the trend line based upon the data from 
the Joy Silk era, Illegal Intimidation charges exceeded 1,500 just two 
years after 1969.  By 1981, these ULP charges would peak at 6,493 in 
 
 114. Data for Illegal Intimidation ULPs taken from Table 2 of the NLRB’s Annual 
Reports from 1959 to 2009.  See 24 NLRB ANN. REP. 163 (1959) through 74 NLRB ANN. 
REP. 95 (2009).  The two lines labeled “Linear” compare trend lines derived from data from 
1959-1969 and date from 1970-1980. 
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1981, an increase of 575% since 1969.  The path followed by the data 
on Illegal Intimidation charges following 1969 simply could not have 
been predicted by the trend in the data prior to that year.  Rather, the 
dramatic upward jolt in the data from one trend line to another— a 
change of approximately sixty-five degrees— depicts a conspicuous 
disjuncture strongly suggestive that something occurred in 1969 to 
sharply increase ULPs. 
A similar trend occurred with “Illegal Discharge” ULPs.  Figure 8, 
infra, displays the total number of charges filed with the NLRB from 
1959 to 1969 alleging “Illegal Discharge.”  Figure 8 also includes a 
linear regression based upon data from 1959 to 1969 to project a trend 
line into the years from 1970 forward. 
 
Figure 8
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As seen in Figure 8, the trend line based upon the data from 1959 
to 1969 predicts that, in the ten years following 1969, Illegal Discharge 
ULPs would not exceed 12,000.  Furthermore, if the trend from 1959 to 
1969 continued without deviation through 2009, Illegal Discharges 
would not have exceeded 16,000 even after forty years. 
In reality, however, the trend line did deviate quite dramatically 
following the NLRB’s abandonment of Joy Silk.  
 
 
115. Data for Illegal Discharge ULPs taken from Table 2 of the NLRB’s Annual Reports 
from 1959 to 2009.  See 24 NLRB ANN. REP. 163 (1959) through 74 NLRB ANN. REP. 95 
(2009).  The line labeled "Linear” is a projection of a trend line derived from data from 1959 
to 1969 only. 
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Figure 9
116
 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 9, rather than needing forty years to 
double, Illegal Discharge ULPs doubled in eight years.  This 
constitutes an acceleration in the rate of increase of Illegal Discharge 
ULPs of approximately five times faster following the abandonment of 
Joy Silk than when the doctrine was in place. 
The increase in Illegal Intimidation and Discharge ULPs 
following the abandonment of Joy Silk are both dramatic and 
unprecedented.  The sheer magnitude of the change in trends strongly 
indicates that 1969 was a pivotal year for ULPs.  Moreover, the upward 
trends in ULPs start immediately with the abandonment of Joy Silk.  
This is a point of chronology, but chronology is fundamental to 
showing causation.  Joy Silk was abandoned, and the increase in ULPs 
immediately followed.  Moreover, the timing is not close or 
approximate; it is exact.  The trends began as soon as the NLRB 
stopped applying Joy Silk. 
Furthermore, the increase in ULPs stabilized and then declined as 
soon as union elections began declining.
117
  This trend in the declines 
of ULPs and elections suggests that the ULPs are being committed in 
the context of elections—something about the NLRB’s election process 
changed in a way that led to the increased ULPs.  One plausible 
 
 116. Data for Illegal Discharge ULPs taken from Table 2 of the NLRB’s Annual Reports 
from 1959 to 2009.  See 24 NLRB ANN. REP. 163 (1959) through 74 NLRB ANN. REP. 95 
(2009).  The lines labeled “Linear” compare the trend lines derived from the data from 
1959-1969 and 1970-1980. 
 117. See Figures 1, 7 and 9, supra. 
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explanation to account for dramatic increase in ULPs, therefore, is a 
change in the legal regime that either decreased deterrence or increased 
incentives for employers to commit ULPs.  The only significant change 
in the NLRB’s election process that occurred in 1969 was the adoption 
of Gissel and the abandonment of Joy Silk.
118
  This change, therefore, is 
the only candidate within the legal regime that can account both for the 
timing and the subsequent contours of the increase in ULPs. 
Is there an alternative explanation that can account for this 
development better than the abandonment of Joy Silk? 
One possibility is that something changed in the culture of 
employers to make them more antagonistic against unions and 
therefore more prone to commit ULPs.  This explanation is a traditional 
one offered by such labor scholars as Richard B. Freeman.
119
  
However, this so-called alternative is not really independent of the 
explanation based upon the abandonment of Joy Silk.  Even if 
management became culturally more hostile to unions, it seems 
unlikely that employers would significantly increase the commission of 
ULPs unless they perceived little deterrence in the legal regime.  
Second, the trend lines are far too abrupt for what would be expected 
for a purely cultural change.  Rather, the nearly instantaneous increase 
in the commission of ULPs after 1969 is better explained by a 
management culture already hostile to unions, with a sudden change in 
the legal regime that reduced deterrence.  Therefore, there is a strong 
case that the abandonment of Joy Silk caused the increase. 
The above demonstration provides evidence for the conclusion 
that the abandonment of Joy Silk caused—or at least contributed to—
the increase in ULPs that followed 1969.  Even regarding the proof as 
indefinite, however, the Board is not held to the standard of scientific 
precision and may take reasonable steps to address concerns.  The 
Board’s construction must be “at least permissible under [the Act],” 
while reconciling “conflicting interests of labor and management.”120  
The Board’s decision to change policy must be made “in light of 
changing industrial practices and the Board’s cumulative experience in 
 
 118. See 34 NLRB ANN. REP. 113-15 (1969).   
 119. See Richard B.  Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, Employer Behavior in the Face of 
Union Organizing Drives, (Nat’l Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 2805, 
1988). 
 120. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S.  251, 266–67 (1975); see also NLRB v. 
Curtin Matheson Sci., Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 787 (1990) (“We will uphold a Board rule as long 
as it is rational and consistent with the Act) (citing Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. 
NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 38 (1987)), even if we would have formulated a different rule had we 
sat on the Board,” (citing Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 
413, 418 (1982))). 
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dealing with labor-management relations.”121  The evidence presented 
above demonstrates that the Board’s cumulative experience provides 
ample justification for readopting Joy Silk.   
D.  The Re-Adoption of Joy Silk is Supported by the Text and Purposes 
of the Act and Supreme Court Precedents. 
1. Joy Silk Has a Firm Foundation in the Text of the Act. 
The Board’s interpretation of the Act will be accepted so long as it 
constitutes a reasonable construction of the Act’s text.122  Here, the Joy 
Silk doctrine establishes a proof model and remedy that is directly tied 
to the Act’s statutory text.  First, Joy Silk’s premise is that an employer 
violates the Act by refusing without good faith to recognize and 
negotiate with a designated collective bargaining representative.
123
  
This premise is rooted in the plain terms of § 8(a)(5), as defined by 
Section 8(d) of the NLRA.
124
  Section 8(a)(5) of the Act proscribes an 
employer’s “refus[al] to bargain collectively with the representative of 
his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a),”125 and 
Section 8(d) defines the term “bargain collectively” used in Section 
8(a)(5) to be an obligation to meet and confer “in good faith.”126 
The second element of the Joy Silk doctrine is its signal feature, 
i.e., the interpretation of § 9(a) that representatives may be chosen by 
employees by means other than a Board-supervised election.
127
 The 
interpretation is based upon the text of Section 9(a), which defines a 
collective representative as one “designated or selected”— but not 
certified— “for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of 
the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes.”128  If Section 
9(a) required that a collective representative be “certified” as the 
majority representative, that would leave no option but an election for 
choosing the representative because elections are the only method 
under which the NLRB can certify a representative.
129
  Section 9(a) 
 
 121. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 266 (emphasis added); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 
U.S. 483, 501 (1978) (stating that as the nation’s appointed labor relations expert, “[t]he 
ultimate problem is the balancing of the conflicting legitimate interests.  The function of 
striking that balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate 
responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations 
Board, subject to limited judicial review”). 
 122. See Notes 120-21, supra. 
 123. Joy Silk, supra note 8. 
 124. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
 125. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).   
 126. 29 U.S.C. § 160(d). 
 127. See Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB at 1265. 
 128. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).   
 129. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B).   
134 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:57 
does not use the term “certify,” however, and this is taken to mean that 
the representative may be chosen by means other than elections, such 
as through authorization cards.
130
  This reading of the Act is sound and 
received the full unanimous endorsement of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
the Gissel opinion.
131
  Indeed, if this were not the case, an employer’s 
decision to voluntarily recognize a majority-supported union could not 
bestow Section 9(a) status.  But voluntary recognition has been 
recognized and enforced for virtually the entire history of the Act.
132
 
Joy Silk has a third element that also is solidly based within the 
statutory text, i.e. that a refusal to bargain that lacks good faith is most 
strongly evidenced by the commission of ULPs.  This is a sound 
premise because most ULPs require anti-union animus, or the rejection 
of the collective bargaining principle and the right to engage in 
concerted activity.
133
  Violating Sections 8(a)(1) or (8)(a)(3), which are 
the most relevant employer ULPs, requires that the employer interfered 
with, coerced, or discriminated against an employee based upon the 
employee’s exercise of their rights under Section 7, such as the right to 
act collectively for mutual aid and protection.
134
 
Finally, Joy Silk’s remedy arises from the text of the Act.  Because 
the ULP in a Joy Silk case is a violation of Section 8(a)(5) for failing to 
bargain in good faith with a designated Section 9(a) representative, the 
basic remedy is a cease and desist order to stop refusing to bargain in 
good faith.
135
  The issuance of a bargaining order under Joy Silk, 
therefore, is nothing more than an order to stop engaging in the 
violation.
136
 
In sum, Joy Silk establishes a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the 
Act when an employer, without good faith, refuses to bargain with a 
union designated by a majority of employees through the execution of 
authorization cards.  The doctrine then prescribes the traditional 
remedy for a Section 8(a)(5) violation, i.e., a bargaining order, to 
remedy the violation. 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 597 (1969). 
 132. Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 739 (2011).   
 133. See Note 138, infra. 
 134. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1)-(5); see also Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980) 
(requiring the NLRB’s General Counsel to prove animus to establish § 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) 
charges), enf’d, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 
(1983) (affirming the NLRB’s Wright Line doctrine). 
 135. See Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB at 1266. 
 136. See Caterair International, 322 N.L.R.B. 64, 68 (1996) (“An affirmative bargaining 
order is ‘the traditional, appropriate remedy for an 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain with the lawful 
collective-bargaining representative of an appropriate unit of employees.’”). 
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2.  Joy Silk Is Fully Supported by the Supreme Court’s Opinion 
in Gissel. 
It seems strange to observe that the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Gissel fully supports the Joy Silk doctrine because the argument in 
Gissel provided the setting for the abandonment of Joy Silk.  Yet it 
remains that Gissel is wholly supportive of Joy Silk.  As the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Gissel makes clear, it was not the Supreme Court 
who abandoned Joy Silk during oral argument before the Court.
137
 
Indeed, in the absence of Manoli’s abandonment of Joy Silk, the 
Gissel opinion otherwise reads largely as an endorsement of the 
abandoned Joy Silk approach.
 138
  Most critically, in Gissel, the 
Supreme Court provided definitive authority for the principle that a 
union may be designated as an exclusive representative under Section 
9(a) through authorization cards and without an election.
139
 
Almost from the inception of the Act, then, it was recognized that 
a union did not have to be certified as the winner of a Board election to 
invoke a bargaining obligation; it could establish majority status by 
other means under the ULP provision of Section 8(a)(5)— for instance, 
by showing convincing support, by a union-called strike or strike vote, 
or, as here, by possession of cards signed by a majority of the 
employees authorizing the union to represent them for collective 
bargaining purposes.
 140
  This interpretation of the Wagner Act and the 
present Act is well-settled, particularly as to the use of authorization 
cards.
141
 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court repeatedly cited with favor the 
NLRB’s decision in Aaron Brothers,142 which was the Board’s leading 
case under the Joy Silk doctrine at that time.
143
 
 
 137. See Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 594 (“Although the Board’s brief before this 
Court generally followed the approach as set out in Aaron Bros., the Board announced at 
oral argument that it had virtually abandoned the Joy Silk doctrine altogether.”). 
 138. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 597–98.   
 139. Id. 
 140. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 597–99 (1969) (footnotes and citations omitted). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Aaron Bros.,158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966).   
 143. The most significant passage of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gissel regarding 
Aaron Bros. is as follows: 
As we have pointed out, however, an employer is not obligated to accept a card check 
as proof of majority status, under the Board’s current practice, and he is not required to 
justify his insistence on an election by making his own investigation of employee sentiment 
and showing affirmative reasons for doubting the majority status.  See Aaron Bros., 158 
N.L.R.B. 1077, 1078.  If he does make an investigation, the Board’s recent cases indicate 
that reasonable polling in this regard will not always be termed violative of § 8(a)(1) if 
conducted in accordance with the requirements set out in Struksnes Construction Co., 165 
N.L.R.B. No. 102 (1967).  And even if an employer’s limited interrogation is found 
violative of the Act, it might not be serious enough to call for a bargaining order.  See Aaron 
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Although the union involved in the Gissel case argued that the 
Board’s policy was incorrect because the employer should be required 
either to recognize the union or file a petition for an election, the Court 
declined to address this argument, noting only that the Board’s new 
position made it unnecessary.
144
  In short, the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Gissel does not so much as hint at the presence of a fatal defect in 
the Joy Silk doctrine. 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Linden Lumber145 also does not 
undermine the vitality of Joy Silk.  In Linden Lumber, the Supreme 
Court simply affirmed that, in light of the Board’s policy of preferring 
elections, the Board did not abuse its discretion by refusing to find a 
violation of Section 8(a)(5) on the grounds that an employer refused to 
bargain with a union without the conduct of an election— despite clear 
evidence presented to the employer that the union was supported by a 
majority of employees.
146
  While the Supreme Court ruled that the 
Board’s interpretation was permissible, the Justices found this to be a 
close issue because the outcome appeared irreconcilable with the plain 
text of Section 8(a)(5).
147
  Indeed, four dissenting Justices argued that 
the Board was obligated to find a violation of Section 8(a)(5) under the 
language of the Act, and that the Board was precluded from citing 
policy reasons for failing to do so.
148
  The Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Linden Lumber, therefore, is fully supportive of the Board’s authority 
under the Act to find a violation of Section 8(a)(5) for an employer’s 
failure to recognize and bargain in good faith with a union designated 
as the collective bargaining representative through authorization cards. 
 
Bros.; Hammond & Irving, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 1071 (1965). 
As noted above, the Board has emphasized that not ‘any employer conduct found 
violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, regardless of its nature or gravity, will necessarily 
support a refusal-to-bargain finding,’ Aaron Bros., at 1079; Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 
609-10.  Aaron Bros. amended the Joy Silk doctrine by specifying that it was General 
Counsel’s obligation to establish that the employer’s failure to bargain lacked good faith, 
rather than an employer being obligated to affirmatively demonstrate good faith. 
 144. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 595.   
 145. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 309–10 (1974). 
 146. Id. (“In light of the statutory scheme and the practical administrative procedural 
questions involved, we cannot say that the Board’s decision that the union should go 
forward and ask for an election on the employer’s refusal to recognize the authorization 
cards was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.”). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 317 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“The language and history of the Act clearly 
indicate that Congress intended to impose upon an employer the duty to bargain with a 
union that has presented convincing evidence of majority support, even though the union has 
not petitioned for and won a Board-supervised election.  ‘It is not necessary for us to justify 
the policy of Congress.  It is enough that we find it in the statute.  That policy cannot be 
defeated by the Board’s policy’” (quoting Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 
355, 363 (1949))).   
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The Linden Lumber Board’s identification of a “good faith 
thicket” as a reason for rejecting Joy Silk is an exceedingly thin 
rationale.
149
  The obligation to determine the good faith conduct of 
employers and unions arises from a clear statutory command of the 
Act, regardless of whether the Board finds it to be a “thicket.”150  
Furthermore, the Board remains obligated to engage the thicket in 
order to enforce Section 8(a)(5) in all contexts other than Joy Silk.
151
 
Whatever evidentiary difficulties attend the good faith “thicket” of 
the Joy Silk doctrine pale in comparison to the affirmative harm 
wrought by its absence in the forty years since its abandonment, 
whether measured from the massive increase in violations of the Act 
that ensued or the substantial reduction in representation elections. 
3.  Joy Silk Was Accepted by Most Circuit Courts. 
In addition, the Joy Silk doctrine was accepted in principle by 
every Circuit in the nation prior to its abandonment by the NLRB in 
1969.
152
  This is significant because most Circuits follow, in cases of 
intra-Circuit conflicts, the rule that the earliest panel decision on the 
point governs unless and until that opinion is overruled by the court 
sitting en banc or the Supreme Court.
153
  This rule provides reason to 
believe that many of the Circuits remain bound by authority holding 
that Joy Silk is a permissible interpretation of the Act. 
 
 149. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 719, 720–21 (1971). 
 150. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(d). 
 151. A context where “good faith thickets” unavoidably remain arises from cases 
involving an employer’s basical duty to negotiate with an exclusive representative in good 
faith.  See, e.g., A-L King Size Sandwiches, Inc., 265 NLRB 850, 858 (1982) (“[R]esolution 
of surface bargaining allegations, as has often been stated, never presents an easy issue.  The 
problems are complex, “no two cases are alike.” and “none can be determinative precedent 
for another, as good faith bargaining 'can have meaning only in its application to the 
particular facts of a particular case'”) (quoting Borg-Warner Controls, a Division of Borg-
Warner Corporation, 198 NLRB 726, 729-730 (1972), enfd. 732 F.2d 872 (11th Cir. 1984).     
 152. NLRB v. Ken Rose Motors, Inc., 193 F.2d 769 (1st Cir. 1952); NLRB v, Pyne 
Molding Corp., 226 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Epstein, 203 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1953); 
NLRB v. Inter-City Advert. Co., 190 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1951); NLRB v. Southland Paint 
Co., 394 F.2d 717, 724 (5th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Armco Drainage & Metal Products, 220 
F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Taitel, 261 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1958); NLRB v. Wheeling 
Pipe Line Inc., 229 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1956); NLRB v. Trimfit of Cal. Inc., 211 F.2d 206 
(9th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Hamilton, 220 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1955).  Note, the Eleventh 
Circuit is bound by the opinions of the former-Fifth Circuit. 
 153. See, e.g., United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 567 (6th Cir. 2006); McMellon v. 
United States, 387 F.3d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 
F.3d 920, 929 (11th Cir. 2003); Southard v. Tex. Bd. of Crim. Justice, 114 F.3d 539, 549 
(5th Cir. 1997); Kostelec v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 64 F.3d 1220, 1228 n.8 (8th Cir. 
1995); In re Smith, 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993). 
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4.   Joy Silk Is Supported by a Logical Rationale. 
Joy Silk is based upon a more convincing rationale than Gissel.  
The key premise of the Joy Silk doctrine is that an employer who 
responds to a union’s demand for recognition by committing ULPs 
does not have good faith doubts about its employees’ support for the 
union and also does not accept its employees’ right to unionize and the 
collective-bargaining principle.
154
  This premise is readily believable.  
After all, an employer who truly believed that a union lacked support 
from a majority of employees would not need to resort to illegal tactics, 
such as intimidation or electoral bribery.  Rather, these tactics betoken 
the employer’s apparent judgment that the employees truly do support 
the union, which is why the coercive tactics become necessary.  The 
coercion also adequately demonstrates the employer’s culpable belief 
that the employees’ uninhibited wishes are not worthy of respect.  The 
proof model under Joy Silk, therefore, is altogether canny. 
5.  Joy Silk Will Advance the Purposes of the Act by Increasing 
the Number of Elections, Reducing ULPs, and Ensuring 
Fairer Elections. 
The restoration of Joy Silk will advance the goals and purposes of 
the NLRA by increasing the number of elections overall, reducing 
ULPs committed during elections, and securing fairer elections 
consistent with the standard of laboratory conditions.  To begin, the 
restoration of Joy Silk is likely to lead to a dramatic increase in the 
number of representation elections conducted by the Board. 
Critics say that the purpose of restoring Joy Silk is to reduce the 
number of Board-supervised representational elections.  This criticism 
seriously misjudges the likely effects of Joy Silk.  Rather than reduce 
elections, the Joy Silk doctrine’s most likely and immediate effect will 
be to seriously reduce the incidence of ULPs.  Under Joy Silk, an 
employer who wishes to resist unionization faces two options: 1) to 
commit ULPs and bring upon itself years of litigation that ultimately 
lead to a bargaining order, and, after that, months of tough bargaining 
to avoid an agreement; or 2) engage in a lawful campaign of persuasion 
with employees prior to an election, and, if that is unsuccessful, months 
of tough bargaining to avoid an agreement.  Between these two 
options, the first option is far more costly and has the added drawback 
of leading to the same destination as the less costly second option.  
Rational employers will see this logic and follow the latter option—that 
is, they will insist upon elections and avoid ULPs.  This choice will 
 
 154. Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB at 1265. 
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result in elections occurring at higher rates, but with far fewer ULPs. 
Indeed, those who would suggest that Joy Silk will reduce the 
number of secret ballot elections have it exactly backwards:  It was the 
abandonment of Joy Silk and the adoption of Gissel that has massively 
reduced secret-ballot collective bargaining elections in this country.
155
  
From 1970 to 2009, the number of elections held by the NLRB per year 
dropped from 8,074 to 1,704.
156
  The number of elections in 2009 was 
the lowest number of elections in NLRB history since 1940.
157
 But 
comparing 2009 to 1940 is inapt.  In 1940, the Board only conducted 
1,192 collective bargaining elections, but those elections involved 
590,000 eligible workers.
158
  Only 96,030 workers were involved in the 
1,704 elections that the Board conducted in 2009.
159
  Thus, it may 
fairly be said that we are witnessing the lowest levels of election 
activity since the enactment of the Act. 
In contrast, the average number of elections from 1949 to 1969 
was 6,431 as compared to 3,147 elections on average from 1989 to 
2009.
160
  As shown in Figure 10, infra, the number of elections fell 
from over ten per 100,000 employees to fewer than two elections per 
100,000 employees since the abandonment of Joy Silk. 
 
  
 
 155. See Figure 1, infra, and accompanying text. 
 156. Compare 42 NLRB ANN. REP. 18 (1977), with 74 NLRB ANN. REP. 13 (2009). 
 157. Compare 74 NLRB ANN. REP. 13 (2009), with 5 NLRB ANN. REP. 18 (1940). 
 158. See 5 NLRB ANN. REP. 18 (1940). 
 159. 74 NLRB ANN. REP. 11, 13 (2009). 
 160. See supra note 9; see also, e.g., John T. Dunlop, Fact Finding Report: Commission 
on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, 66-67, 81 (U.S. Dep’t of Labor & U.S.  
Dep’t of Commerce 1994) (noting that during the 1950s, the height of the Joy Silk regime, 
the Board conducted nearly 6,000 elections, involving over 700,000 workers). 
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Figure 10
161
 
 
 
Given the average of approximately twelve elections per 100,000 
employees in the nonfarm workforce under the Joy Silk regime, and a 
current nonfarm workforce of more than 130 million, the historical 
rates would project approximately 15,000 elections per year if the 
Board restores Joy Silk as valid labor law.
162
  The Board’s experience 
with Joy Silk, therefore, shows that Joy Silk had no effect of limiting 
elections.  To the contrary, Joy Silk is necessary to provide a sufficient 
level of protection to make more numerous elections feasible. 
Moreover, the elections that the Board conducts are far more 
likely to meet the Board requirement of “laboratory conditions” than 
the elections held by the Board under the Gissel rule following the 
abandonment of Joy Silk.
163
  In General Shoe, the Board set the goal 
that elections “provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be 
conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine 
the uninhibited desires of the employees.”164  Contrary to the goals of 
General Shoe, the Gissel doctrine actually has the effect of routinizing 
 
 161. Nonfarm payroll data taken from the Database on Institutional Characteristics of 
Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS Database).  See 
Note 1, supra. 
 162. A nonfarm payroll of 136,860,000 taken from the ICTWSS Database. See Note 1, 
supra.  The Board’s historic experience suggests that it may take ten to twelve years for 
elections to rise to the ratios of ten per 100,000 employees seen prior to the abandonment of 
Joy Silk.   
 163. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948). 
 164. Id. 
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a baseline level of ULPs that will be deemed ordinary, or at least not 
extraordinary, in the administration of the Act.  Because this “ordinary” 
level of ULPs is not sufficient to warrant a bargaining remedy, it is the 
precise level of ULPs that an anti-union employer will seek to commit.  
Having an “ordinary” level of ULPs is incompatible with General 
Shoe’s policy of laboratory conditions.  Joy Silk, therefore, is the 
proper policy for an agency that wants to attain the goal of General 
Shoe. 
In fulfillment of General Shoe’s promise of “laboratory 
conditions,” the restoration of Joy Silk should radically reduce the 
incidence of the commission of ULPs during union organizing 
campaigns.  As discussed in Part I, supra, the historic evidence shows 
that, under the Joy Silk regime, employers committed on average 
approximately one Illegal Discharge and 0.11 Illegal Intimidation 
ULPs per election.  After the abandonment of Joy Silk, these averages 
increased to 3.2 Illegal Discharge and 1.08 Illegal Intimidation ULPs 
per election.
165
  These comparative averages suggest a drop of 66% for 
Illegal Discharge ULPs per election and of 90% for Illegal Intimidation 
ULPs.  Using 2009 numbers and presuming that the number of 
elections remains constant, we would expect to see the number of 
Illegal Discharge ULPs to drop from 6,411 to 2,180 and Illegal 
Intimidation ULPs to drop from 2,461 to 246.  A decrease in the 
violations of the Act on this scale certainly provides a sound reason for 
the NLRB to return to this policy.
166
 
The abandonment of Joy Silk fundamentally undermined the 
central purpose of the NLRA by massively reducing the NLRB’s 
activity with regard to collective bargaining.  The NLRB is now, and 
for decades has been, an agency that predominately processes and 
adjudicates ULPs, with a much smaller function involving resolving 
questions concerning collective representation.  As Figure 11, infra, 
demonstrates, ULP filings have dwarfed petitions by a rate of nearly 
four to one since at least the late 1970s.  This leads to the result 
depicted in Chart 15 from the Annual Report of the NLRB for Fiscal 
Year 2009, which shows that nearly 90% of the agency’s docket 
 
 165. See supra Figure 5. 
 166. The actual number of ULPs may not drop in the manner described, however, 
because the number of ULPs likely will remain tied to the number of elections.  While the 
number of ULPs per election should decrease significantly, the number of elections is likely 
to increase significantly.  This dynamic makes a projection of the effect on the absolute 
number of ULP filings difficult to predict.  Furthermore, it took ten to twelve years for the 
abandonment of Joy Silk to have its ultimate impact on the rate at which both election and 
ULPs were filed.  See supra Figures 1 and 5. It is reasonable to expect a similar time period 
for a re-implementation of Joy Silk to drive down the ULPs to the ratios per election seen 
prior to the abandonment of Joy Silk.   
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consists of ULPs, with only about 10% consisting representation 
matters.
167
  ULPs have comprised at least 80% of the NLRB’s activities 
since the early 1980s.
168
 
 
Figure 11
169
 
 
 
Based on the Findings and Policy statement that introduces the 
NLRA, this state of affairs constitutes a profound perversion of the 
purposes of the Act.  In the statement, Congress announces the 
following as the purposes of the Act: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to 
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free 
flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions 
when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and 
procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise 
 
 167. 74 NLRB ANN. REP. 17 (2009).   
 168. Id. 
 169. Data for ULPs taken from Table 2 of the NLRB’s Annual Reports from 1959 to 
2009.  See 24 NLRB ANN. REP. 163 (1959) through 74 NLRB Ann. Rep. 95 (2009).  Data 
on election petitions taken from Chart 11 and Table 13 of the Annual Report of the NLRB 
volume 26 (1961); from Chart 12 and Table 13 from volumes 27 through 29 (1962-1964); 
from the unnumbered Chart on page 15 and Table 11A from volumes 35 and 36 (1970-
1971); and Table 11A and Chart 12 of the Annual Reports of the NLRB volumes 30 through 
34 (1965-1969) and 37 through 74 (1972-2009).  See 29 NLRB ANN. REP. 20 (1964) to74 
NLRB Ann. Rep. 13 (2009). 
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by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and 
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the 
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their 
employment or other mutual aid or protection.
170
 
As this statement makes clear, the key purpose of the Act is to 
“encourage the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.”171  
The Act, therefore, does not “protect the exercise by workers of full 
freedom of association [and] self-organization” as an end in itself, but 
rather provides these protections “for the purpose of negotiating the 
terms and conditions of their employment and other mutual aid or 
protection.”172  For the current Board, however, ends and means have 
become inverted.  The processing of ULPs has become its primary 
purpose.  The Board does not enforce against ULPs for the purpose of 
“encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining,”173 
because collective bargaining is increasingly not occurring. 
If nothing else, Figure 11, supra, demonstrates that the NLRB’s 
current interpretation and administration of the Act has gone drastically 
off course.  If the NLRB cannot deter ULPs sufficiently that collective 
bargaining is actually encouraged and practiced, then the agency is 
failing.  This agency is and has been failing in its purpose ever since 
the Board abandoned Joy Silk.  It is possible that Joy Silk will not work 
as successfully in 2016 as it did in 1955, but one can hardly imagine 
that it will work less well than the current situation under Gissel. 
 
IV.  IN RE-ADOPTING JOY SILK, THE BOARD SHOULD AMEND THE 
DOCTRINE TO ACCOMMODATE CHANGES IN THE LAW SINCE ITS 
ABANDONMENT. 
Joy Silk has been absent from the legal landscape of the United 
States for over forty years, and the country has not stood still during its 
absence.  It is only natural that the doctrine, if re-adopted today, should 
be modified to reflect changing circumstances and developments in the 
law.  Two such adaptations are recommended here. 
 
 170.  29 U.S.C. § 151.   
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
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A.  Application of Joy Silk should be Limited to Evidence that the 
Employer Rejects the Collective Bargaining Principle, Desires to 
Thwart Employee Free Choice, or Wishes to Gain Time to Undermine 
the Union. 
The first modification to the resurrected Joy Silk doctrine should 
address the knotty conceptual problems that led NLRB Associate 
General Counsel Manoli to unilaterally abandon Joy Silk in the first 
place.  That problem was: if a bargaining order is based on a finding 
that an employer refused to recognize and bargain with a union without 
good faith, what should the Board do when the employer refused 
recognition out of a simple preference for a secret ballot election?
174
  
This is not an insurmountable conceptual problem, and the Board was 
well on its way toward resolving it in 1969 before Manoli triggered the 
shift away from the doctrine. 
Under the Joy Silk doctrine, the Board identified four methods that 
the General Counsel could use to show that an employer’s refusal to 
recognize a majority-supported union was in bad faith. General 
Counsel could show: 
[1] employer conduct displaying a rejection of the collective-
bargaining principle, [2] a purpose to thwart or interfere with the 
employees’ free choice of their bargaining representative, [3] a 
desire to gain time within which to undermine the union or 
dissipate the majority, or [4] by independent knowledge of the 
employer that the union has a majority.
175
 
Of these four methods of proof, the fourth— independent 
knowledge of the employer that the union has a majority— should be 
eliminated from any re-adoption of the Joy Silk doctrine.  This method 
of proof is problematic because an employer with independent 
knowledge that the union has majority support from its employees still 
may have lawful reasons to want an election.  Even if an employer is 
certain that the majority of employees have voluntarily supported a 
union, the employer could, nevertheless, believe in good faith that it 
might persuade them to vote against the union in an election through a 
non-coercive appeal to reason.  An employer acting under this belief 
would not appear to violate the NLRA under any obvious theory.  After 
all, the NLRA does give employees the right to refrain from associating 
with a union.
176
  Furthermore, Section 8(c) of the Act specifies that the 
expression of an employer’s views, if not coercive or threatening, 
 
 174. Cooper & Nolan, supra Note 48, at 218-21. 
 175. Aaron Bros. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966) (Member Jenkins, concurring). 
 176. See 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
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cannot be deemed evidence of an unfair labor practice.
177
 If the 
employer merely wishes to express his or her views to employees prior 
to an election, the employer would seem to be within his rights to do 
so.  Merely showing an employer’s independent knowledge that the 
union has majority support, therefore, is insufficient to prove a 
violation.  Accordingly, this method of establishing a violation of 
Section 8(a)(5) should not be included in the re-adoption of Joy Silk. 
B.  Employees’ Right To Refrain from Union Affiliation Can Be 
Accommodated Through Adjustments to the Contract Bar. 
There can be little doubt that judicial concern for the Section 7 
rights of employees to refrain from union activity is higher now than it 
was when Joy Silk was in effect.  This concern is especially evident in 
many Circuits’ emphasis that Gissel bargaining orders be used as a last 
resort and only when other options have been rejected.
178
  It is also seen 
in the D.C. Circuit’s insistence that all bargaining orders issued by the 
Board, not just those issued under the Gissel doctrine, specifically 
analyze whether issuing the bargaining order properly strikes the 
balance between the employees’ Section 7 rights to choose whether or 
not to affiliate with a union.
179
 
The changed legal landscape necessitates a greater 
accommodation to the employees’ right to exercise an uninhibited vote 
through a secret ballot election than was afforded by the Joy Silk 
doctrine.  At the same time, there is a great need for better deterrence 
against ULPs.  The proper balance between these two objectives is not 
found by limiting the issuance of bargaining orders.  Rather, the best 
approach is to withhold application of the contract bar to collective 
bargaining agreements that result from bargaining orders.  The contract 
bar is an NLRB administrative rule under which a petition for a 
representation election or for decertification of a union will be 
dismissed if the bargaining unit is subject to a current collective 
bargaining agreement.
180
  The contract bar should be withheld until 
such time as the union attains certification through an election.  This 
policy is recommended by the following considerations. 
First, the most significant abridgement of an employee’s access to 
a secret-ballot election arises not from the recognition bar following a 
bargaining order, but from the contract bar following the adoption of a 
 
 177. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c). 
 178. See, supra Note 93 and cases cited therein. 
 179. See, e.g., Vincent Indus. Plastics, Inc. v. NLRB, 209 F.3d 727 (2000); Lee Lumber 
& Bldg. Material Corp. v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 1454, 1461-62 (1997); Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 28 F.3d 1243, 1247-48 (1994). 
 180. See General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962). 
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collective bargaining agreement.
181
  The NLRB will apply the bar for a 
reasonable period, which is generally deemed to be three years.
182
  
When courts express concern that a bargaining order could lead to 
employees being unionized without an opportunity to hold a secret-
ballot vote on the issue, they generally are reacting to the fact that the 
contract bar may preclude access to NLRB elections.  This is why 
withholding application of the contract bar will do the most to mollify 
the Circuit courts’ concerns. 
Although a bargaining order will trigger a recognition bar,
183
 
which will preclude petitions for an election for a reasonable period of 
about a year, the employees’ Section 7 interests are slight during this 
period because the union cannot affect terms and conditions of 
employment or subject employees to a union security clause until a 
collective bargaining agreement is attained.
184
  At most, employees 
suffer under a protraction of the status quo with respect to terms and 
condition of employment while negotiations are underway.
185
  
However, this is hardly unfair—the employee initially agreed to those 
terms and conditions voluntarily in accepting and retaining 
employment with that employer. 
Furthermore, the recognition period, which bars petitions for a 
reasonable period following the issuance of a bargaining order, is 
indispensable to ensuring that the bargaining order provides a 
meaningful remedy.  As articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court, “a 
bargaining relationship once rightfully established must be permitted to 
exist and function for a reasonable period in which it can be given a 
fair chance to succeed.”186  The balance of interests under the NLRA, 
therefore, weighs strongly in favor of retaining the recognition bar 
following the entry of a bargaining order. 
Once a collective bargaining agreement is attained, however, the 
union begins to influence the employees’ employment relationship 
directly.  At the commencement of a collective bargaining agreement, 
 
 181. The recognition bar spans a period of a year during which the union holds an 
irrebuttable presumption of majority status.  See Keller Plastics Eastern, 157 N.L.R.B. 583 
(1966); Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 99-100 (1954).   
 182. General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. at 1128-29. 
 183. The entry of bargaining order will trigger a recognition bar.  See Frank Bros. Co. v. 
NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 705–06 (1944).  The purpose of this period is to enable the bargaining 
relationship to become productive.  Id. 
 184. “[T]he duty to bargain under the Act to require the employer to maintain the status 
quo in mandatory subjects of bargaining prior to negotiations or reaching agreement with 
the union and to offer the union an opportunity to bargain over proposed changes in 
mandatory subjects before changes are implemented. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 284 
NLRB 53, 58 (1987). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
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an unwilling employee can credibly claim to be involuntarily subjected 
to having a union exercise influence over his or her employment 
relationship without having been afforded the opportunity to cast a vote 
in a secret-ballot election.  At this point, therefore, the employees’ 
Section 7 interests in the freedom to refrain from union affiliation 
should take precedence, and employees should be permitted to seek an 
election to reject the union if they are dissatisfied with the terms of the 
collective bargaining agreement, object to unions in principle, or for 
any other reason. 
By withholding the contract bar from a contract resulting from a 
bargaining order, the Board will ensure employees access to the secret-
ballot election.  Withholding the contract bar also provides an incentive 
to the union to file a petition itself in order to obtain the benefit of a 
contract bar.  After all, the most propitious time to conduct an election 
is following the entrance into a collective bargaining agreement.  By 
this point, the employer has arrived at an accommodation with the 
union, and therefore should be expected to harbor less anti-union 
animus following a successful collective bargaining process.  Also, the 
merits and detractions of unionization will be concrete at that point, 
rather than speculative.  This means both the employer and the 
employees will be able to weigh the benefits of unionization based 
upon real considerations.  The contract also often will afford the union 
access to grievance machinery and access to the job site, which will 
ensure more equal footing in the event that the employer chooses to 
engage in illegal conduct.  Moreover, once a contract is in place, 
employer ULPs have less capacity to harm the union.  Not only does 
the contract provide remedies, but the commission of employer ULPs 
will delay any election until the charges are resolved.  This is known as 
the Blocking Charge Rule.
187
  If employer ULPs are deemed to erode 
employee support, the union can take advantage of this rule to delay 
the election until those ULPs are remedied.  Alternatively, if the parties 
proceed to election and the union loses, the commission of ULPs may 
cause the election to be deemed invalid.
188
  Either way, the union 
contract will remain in place until the process reaches a conclusive 
result. 
Lastly, if the union chooses not to file a petition to seek 
certification through an election, the employees suffer no injury.  They 
will remain free to file their own petition.
189
  And if negotiations fail to 
 
 187. See NLRB CASE HANDLING MANUAL, PART 1, UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE 
PROCEEDINGS ¶ 11730 (Feb. 2016); Am. Metal Products, 139 N.L.R.B. 601 (1962). 
 188. Am. Red Cross Missouri-Illinois Blood Servs. Region & Local Union No. 682, Int'l 
Bhd. of Teamsters., 347 NLRB 347, 355 (2006). 
 189. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.60 (providing that an employee or group of employees may 
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produce a collective bargaining agreement, then unionization has failed 
and the objections of employees who oppose unionization are mooted. 
Withholding the application of the contract bar from collective 
bargaining agreements that result from a bargaining order, therefore, 
provides additional concrete assurance that restoration of the Joy Silk 
doctrine will not increase the denial of access to a secret-ballot election 
as employees unionize.
190
  Instead, it will simply help ensure that the 
elections conducted are more orderly, fair, and valid.  As a result, it 
will simultaneously strengthen employees’ right to engage or refrain 
from engaging, without inhibition, in union activity.  Accordingly, it 
would constitute a substantial improvement in the administration of the 
Act and advance the realization of the Act’s legislative goals. 
So amended, the Joy Silk doctrine will satisfy the concerns raised 
by Circuit courts, including the D.C. Circuit, about ensuring that 
employees’ Section 7 rights are not overridden without good cause.  
When an employer is presented with a demand for recognition and 
evidence of majority support, and when that employer responds by 
attempting to dissipate the union’s support through coercion and 
unlawful tactics, due regard for the employees’ Section 7 rights favors 
the entry of the bargaining order in order to vindicate the aspirations 
reflected in the employees’ initial choice.  This would effectuate 
compliance with Section 8(a)(5) and deter the commission of ULPs in 
response to initial organizing by employees.  The bargaining order will 
not override the employees’ Section 7 rights, which are accommodated 
by withholding the contract bar from any collective bargaining 
agreement that results from the bargaining order.  Lastly, if a bad faith 
refusal to bargain is proved, alternative remedies to a bargaining order 
usually will not adequately address the violation, since even the most 
basic remedy—i.e., a cease and desist order from refusing to bargain—
 
file a petition for an election). 
 190. On the other hand, no change to the contract bar should be made in the case of 
voluntary recognitions by an employer for three reasons.  First, the central purpose of the 
Act is to encourage collective bargaining.  Fulfilling that purpose requires encouraging the 
stability of collective bargaining relationships especially in cases where they are voluntarily 
established.  Second, the law ordinarily permits the employer to establish the background 
terms and conditions of employment.  It would seem to violate the Board’s duty to maintain 
neutrality if voluntary recognition, supported by a non-coerced majority of authorization 
cards, was the one instance where an employer is denied the ability to establish background 
conditions of employment.  Third, employees retain the option of quitting, and there is 
nothing inequitable about relying on exit as the primary option for employees who are out-
of-step with both the employer and the majority of their co-workers regarding collective 
representation.  After all, when the employer and the majority of employees do not want a 
union, exit is the only option that the legal regime affords the union supporter.  There is 
nothing unfair, therefore, about leaving this as the primary option for the union opponent as 
well. 
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unavoidably requires bargaining. 
V.  IS THIS MEANINGFUL REFORM?: THE CASE THAT JOY SILK 
WOULD BE A GAME-CHANGER 
To determine whether a restoration of the Joy Silk doctrine will 
have a meaningful impact on the decline of the Labor Movement, an 
appropriate starting point is to ascertain the causes of Labor’s decline.  
The academic literature generally identifies three major hypotheses to 
explain the dramatic decline in the Labor Movement that occurred from 
1970 to present.  For convenience, these hypotheses are referred to as: 
(1) the structural explanation, (2) the ideological explanation, and (3) 
the legal regime explanation.  The merits and shortcomings of each of 
these theories will be addressed in turn. 
The structural explanation is probably the most widely known, 
largely because it is the most intuitive.
191
  Supporters of this hypothesis 
contend that the major cause of the decline of unions was increased 
global competition and the decline of heavily unionized industries in 
the United States.
192
  The decline of unionized industries, and with it 
the implication that unions caused or contributed to the decline, has 
been cited as a reason for why workers are reluctant to join unions.
193
  
This decline is simple enough to demonstrate.  For instance, in 1950, 
33.7% of all employees were employed in manufacturing in the United 
States.
194
  By 1997, only 15.2% were.
195
 At the same time, the share of 
employment in the service sector rose from 11.9% to 29.4%.
196
 
One reason this explanation is widely believed is that it is, to some 
extent, almost certainly true.  Many of the domestic U.S. industries 
most dramatically and detrimentally affected by the acceleration in 
globalization beginning in the 1980s were industries that were heavily 
unionized.  To return to the comparison between manufacturing and 
services, in 1953 42.4% of employees working in manufacturing were 
union members, while just 9.5% of employees working in services 
were.
197
  The decline in manufacturing naturally would negatively 
affect union membership in U.S. merely because these industries 
employed millions of union members. 
 
 191. Seymour Martin Lipset & Ivan Katchanovski, The Future of Private Sector Unions 
in the U.S., in THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE SECTOR UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 10–13 
(James T. Bennett and Bruce E. Kaufman, eds., 2002). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 11. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 12.   
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However, this explanation falls short because the outsized losses 
in union density experienced in the United States are unique.
198
  As 
shown in Figure 12, infra, among major developed counties no other 
country experienced the especially steep decline in labor density as 
seen in the U.S.   
 
FIGURE  12
199
 
 
 The anomalous nature of the decrease in union density in the U.S. 
is damaging to the structural hypothesis because most developed 
economies were subjected to the same challenges in the global 
economy as the U.S., but the labor movements of other nations were 
 
 198. Lipset & Katchanovski, supra note 191, at 13 (noting that comparable structural 
changes took place in most developed countries and rejecting the view that structural 
changes in the U.S. economy can explain the drop it experienced in union density). 
 199. Data from. Visser, ICTWSS Data base. version 5.0. Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
Institute for Advanced Labour Studies AIAS. October 2015. Open access database at: 
www.uva-aias.net/nl/data/ictwss.  The nations presented on Figure 2 were drawn as an 
illustrative sample of developed nations and was not intended to be comprehensive.  For 
other sources comparing the union density of various nations, see Lipset & Katchanovski, 
supra note 191, at 16; Jelle Visser, Union Membership Statistics in 24 Countries, MONTHLY 
LAB. REV. 38, 45-46 (Jan. 2006); Clara Chang & Constance Sorrentino, Union Membership 
Statistics in 12 Countries, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 46, 50 (Dec. 1991).   
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not similarly affected.
200
  As can be seen, by the mid-1970s, the union 
density in the U.S. was approximately ten percentage points lower than 
the other nations represented.  The experience of Canada is particularly 
relevant because it differs so dramatically from that of the U.S.  In the 
face of the same global economic conditions as the U.S., labor density 
in Canada actually increased, rather than decreased.
201
  As of 2011, 
labor density in Canada was approximately 30%.
202
  The variability in 
the union density of each of these developed economies during this 
period, especially the dramatic divergence in experience between 
Canada and the U.S., suggests that factors specific to each country 
exerted a more important influence over each nation’s union density 
than did the global economy in general. 
The second hypothesis for the decline of the Labor Movement can 
be categorized as the ideological cause.  The attribution of the decline 
of labor due to changes in ideology has two variants.  The first argues 
that a change in management ideology to one of increased opposition 
to unions caused the decline.
203
 The second variant hypothesizes that 
unions lost support among the U.S. workforce due to a decline in 
social-democratic sentiments that arose during the Great Depression 
and a revival of libertarian ideologies.
204
  Since these hypotheses focus 
on the opinions of individuals, they are initially verifiable primarily 
through survey data.  Survey results have yielded a lack of statistically 
significant differences in the attitudes of managers in the United States 
and Canada, which undermines the explanation based upon an 
ideological shift among management personnel.
205
  The second 
 
 200. Of all other nations, the experience of France has the most surface similarly to that 
of the U.S.  As in the U.S., union density in France fell from approximately 20% to a bit less 
than 10% from 1960 to 2011.  See ICTWSS database, supra Note 1; see also Lipset & 
Katchanovski, supra note 191, at 16.  Upon close inspection, however, it becomes clear that 
the two nations are not analogous.  Despite low union membership levels, 95% of 
employees in France are covered by collective bargaining agreements.  See Visser, supra 
note 199, at 46.  By contrast, in the U.S., the percentage of employees who are union 
members does not appreciably differ from the percentage covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement.  Id., at 46.  This dramatic difference in union membership versus coverage by 
collective bargaining agreements in France and the U.S. makes comparisons between the 
two regimes difficult, and renders a comparison between each nation’s level of membership 
misleading.  See ICTWSS database, supra Note 1. 
 201. See ICTWSS database, supra Note 1. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Lipset & Katchanovski, supra note 191, at 23 
 204. Lipset & Katchanovski, supra note 191, at 23.  See also William T. Dickens, The 
Effect of Company Campaigns on Certification Elections: Law and Reality Once Again, 36 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 560 (1983) DOC 11; Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, 
Employer Behavior in the Face of Union Organizing Drives (Nat’l Bureau of Economic 
Research, Working Paper No. 2805, 1988).   
 205. Lipset & Katchanovski, supra note 191, at 16. 
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hypothesis, based upon a shift in the ideologies held by employees, 
does enjoy statistical support from survey results.
206
  This survey data 
by itself, however, does not demonstrate that this hypothesis is true. 
Rather, it only means that the hypothesis has cleared an initial hurdle of 
demonstrating that an ideological change actually occurred, and that 
the hypothesis is viable. The survey data does not show, however, that 
this shift in ideology actually exerted an impact on union density in the 
U.S. 
Other evidence strongly undermines the contention that an 
ideological shift can explain the unusual decrease in union membership 
in the U.S.  First, union density in public employment rose during the 
exact period when private sector density was falling.  As seen in Figure 
13, infra, public sector unionism grew steadily and sustained itself 
from the period of 1960 through 2000. 
  
 
 206. Id. at 22-23. 
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FIGURE 13
207
 
 
This fact would seem to completely rebut the hypothesis that 
shifts toward libertarian ideologies were responsible for the decrease in 
union density.  After all, a cultural shift in the ideology of the 
population should be expected to affect the entire population.  Unless 
supporters of this theory can demonstrate why individuals employed in 
the public sector would be immune to the change, the evidence 
suggests that the proposed cultural shift did not have a pivotal impact. 
In addition, the decline in union density was relatively uniform 
across the country.  Whether measured from 1964 to 2013 or 1990 to 
2013, every state in the nation has experienced dramatic losses in union 
density.
208
  During the time period 2000 to 2013, forty-five states and 
the District of Columbia experienced declines in union membership 
with only five states experiencing increases.
209
  The states with 
increases, however, do not follow any pattern related to ideological 
 
 207. Data from Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and 
Coverage Database from the Current Population Survey: Note, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. 
REV. 349–54 (2003); data available at www.unionstats.com.   
 208. See Barry T. Hirsch, David A. Macpherson, & Wayne G. Vroman, Estimates of 
Union Density by State, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 51–55 (July 2001). Data available at 
http://unionstats.gsu.edu/MonthlyLaborReviewArticle.htm. 
 209. Id. 
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orientation.  They were Alabama, Alaska, California, Oklahoma, 
Vermont, and Washington.  Of these, California experienced the 
smallest increase in union density.
210
  Due to the broad regional 
disparities in political opinion in the U.S., the uniformity of the decline 
in union density across states appears inconsistent with a theory that 
ideological orientation is responsible for the decline. 
Lastly, polling data on approval of unions does not support the 
occurrence of a substantial shift in public opinion regarding unions 
during the period of decline in union density.  Long-term assessment of 
popular sentiment toward unions fail to provide any support for the 
contention that popular sentiment shifted against unions in the 1970s.  
Gallup, for instance, recorded public approval toward unions of nearly 
60% through the 1970s and 1980s.
211
  Admittedly, this polling data on 
the approval of unions does not address precisely the same shift from a 
social-democratic to libertarian ideology proposed by Lipset and 
Katchanovski.  But it is reasonable to expect the two opinions to 
correlate, especially if the shift to libertarianism is offered as an 
explanation for the national decrease in union density.  The shift to 
libertarian ideology, however, if it occurred, appears to have failed to 
affect public opinion on unions. 
This brings the discussion to the third hypothesis for the decline in 
private sector union density in the U.S., namely, the legal regime 
explanation.  This view holds that the decline in private sector union 
density in the U.S. is attributable to an element of the legal regime that 
governs private sector labor relations.
212
  The discussion thus far 
already has encountered two critical data points in support of this view.  
The first is the international comparison of union density in other 
developed countries.
213
  That the union density of other nations is 
significantly higher than in the U.S. suggests that the legal regime 
played a role.  Additionally, the drastic divergence between union 
density in the private and public sectors, shown in Figure 13, supra, 
provides more support for the legal regime view.  After all, a relevant 
difference between nations is that they are governed by separate legal 
regimes.  Likewise, a relevant difference between the U.S. private and 
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public sectors is that, in the realm of labor relations, they are governed 
by different legal regimes; the NLRA does not apply to public 
employees.
214
 
Another piece of evidence in support of the legal regime 
hypothesis is the fact that the sector with the second highest union 
density (after public administration) is transportation.
215
  Unions 
usually are estimated to enjoy density of approximately 20% in the 
transportation sector.
216
  This is notable because common carriers, 
which constitute a major portion of the transportation sector, are 
governed by the Railway Labor Act, and not the NLRA.
217
  The airline 
industry, for example, is highly unionized.
218
  With respect to pilots, 
only a single airline was non-union in 2014.
219
  This disparity between 
the fortunes of unions under the NLRA and the RLA provides further 
support that the legal regime is playing a critical factor for determining 
the labor density. 
All of the above provides strong support for the view that the legal 
regime is responsible for the especially low union density in the U.S. 
private sector.  The common thread that ties union density in foreign 
counties, the U.S. public sector, and the U.S. transportation sector is 
the fact that these jurisdictions lie beyond the scope of the NLRA.  
Despite this evidence, some have rejected the legal regime hypothesis 
on the grounds that other countries with higher levels of union density 
have less regulation over labor relations.
220
  This objection ignores the 
stark differences in the background rules governing employment in the 
United States and these other nations.  Almost no other country follows 
the U.S. rule of employment at will, which allows an employer to fire 
workers for any reason or no reason at all.
221
  Rather, most other 
nations in Europe and the United Kingdom have more robust 
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protections of employee tenure, including just cause requirements and 
notice and severance obligations.
222
  This is significant because much 
of the regulation imposed by the NLRA merely extends the kinds of 
protection to employees that the employment at will rule fails to 
provide.  Due to the general absence of protections for employees 
against discharge, changes to the U.S. legal regime that increase these 
protections will make the U.S. system more like nations with higher 
union density, while those that decrease protections will make the U.S. 
system less like those nations. 
Critics also dismiss the legal regime hypothesis because workers 
in different countries perceive little difference between their legal 
regimes.
 223
  Surveys of employee attitudes suggest a basic similarity in 
the perceptions of Canadians and Americans regarding the level of 
legal protection for workers forming unions or the level of animus by 
managers.
224
  A survey result on people’s perceptions of a legal regime, 
however, does not necessarily prove anything about how the legal 
regime operates in practice.  The survey evidence, therefore, does not 
actually prove very much. 
One major shortcoming of the legal regime hypothesis has been in 
identifying precisely what element of the legal regime was responsible 
for driving union density down.  Rich Yeselson has argued that the 
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, also called the Taft-Hartley 
Act, was the change in the law that stanched the Movement’s growth 
and led to its current nadir.
225
  One problem with this theory, however, 
is timing.  Union density in the U.S. grew for several years following 
the implementation of the Taft-Hartley Act.
226
  Moreover, private 
sector union membership continued to grow—albeit not as fast as the 
labor force—for nearly thirty years following the passage of Taft-
Hartley.
227
 Why would it take so long for the Taft-Hartley Act to have a 
detrimental impact?  Indeed, the fuzziness in chronology points to an 
even greater defect in this thesis: Yeselson fails to articulate a causal 
mechanism between the elements of the Taft-Hartley Act and their 
negative effect on union density.  Yeselson identifies five elements of 
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the Taft-Hartley Act that he says “had the most far-reaching impact.”228 
They are: (1) the authority for states to enact right-to-work laws, (2) the 
recognition of employer free speech rights, (3) the prohibition on 
secondary boycotts, (4) the removal of supervisors from the definition 
of employees under the Act, and (5) the non-communist affidavit.
229
  
Nevertheless, he provides no connection between these elements and 
the consequent drop in union density.
230
  Rather, he leaves the reader to 
infer that such a causal mechanism exists.  In light of the years of 
growth in both union density and union membership that occurred 
following 1947,
231
 the more natural inference is that these elements had 
little direct effect on union density. 
Others attribute Labor’s decline to the ability of employers to 
permanently replace striking workers.
232
  Those who hold this view 
point specifically refer to President Ronald Reagan’s replacement of 
striking air traffic controllers as a watershed moment because it 
signaled that union busting had become respectable.
233
  Here too, 
timing is a problem.  While President Reagan’s firing of over 11,000 
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization strikers constituted 
an dismal point in U.S. labor history,
234
 an employer’s right to 
permanently replace strikers dates back to 1938.
235
  Given that the 
majority of labor’s dramatic increase in union density occurred in the 
presence of this point of law, it is difficult to understand how this 
element of the law could be responsible for the inability of the Labor 
Movement to grow. 
The most common variant of the legal regime hypothesis focuses 
on the NLRA’s lack of punitive measures to deter against the 
commission of unfair labor practices.
236
  This was the hypothesis that 
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drove Labor to push for the Labor Law Reform Act of 1977,
237
 and has 
been the focus by far of the most commentary on the shortcomings of 
the NLRA.
238
  The missing piece to this theory has been an explanation 
for the lack of strong penalties being problematic in the 1980s, but not 
in the 1950s and 1960s.  Instead, proponents of this theory have 
generally espoused that employer opposition to unions spontaneously 
increased in the 1970s.
239
  The following passage from an empirical 
study by Richard B. Freeman and Morris M. Kleiner typifies the 
reliance on this assumption: 
In the 1960s management at most large firms recognized unions as 
a permanent labor market institution and viewed collective 
bargaining as an acceptable mode for determining wages and 
working conditions . . . In the l970s and l980s management’s 
attitude and behavior changed dramatically.  The goal of a union-
free environment, once espoused by fringes of the management 
community, spread until by 1983 45% of the relatively progressive 
firms in the BNA’s Personnel Practices Forum declared that being 
nonunion was their major labor relations goal.  Unfair labor 
practices committed by management skyrocketed despite a decline 
in NLRB representation elections, and approximately one-third of 
the firms whose workers voted to unionize remained nonunion by 
failing to sign a collective contract, effectively reversing the result 
of the election.
240
 
The view expressed seems to be the NLRA always lacked 
effective deterrence, but the lack of deterrence only became a problem 
in the 1970s when employer sentiment turned resolutely anti-union.  
What this narrative fails to contemplate is that, rather than employer 
sentiment changing, it might have been the legal regime that changed, 
and that this change in the law may have led employers to act more 
freely on their previously-held anti-union preferences.
241
 
 In this article, I have supplied what has been missing from the 
legal regime hypothesis: namely, a discrete change in the legal regime 
whose introduction corresponds with Labor’s decline.  Under this 
explanation, returning to Joy Silk will be meaningful labor law reform 
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indeed.  A return to Joy Silk should be expected to significantly revive 
labor’s fortunes in the United States by neutralizing the most 
significant impediment to worker organizing: illegal employer 
opposition. 
CONCLUSION 
The central argument of this article is that the NLRA can be fixed, 
and the repair does not require the intervention of Congress.  The 
problem of too many ULPs during NLRB elections did not always 
exist.  It arose when it did for a reason.  As I have endeavored in this 
article to demonstrate, the abandonment of Joy Silk likely caused the 
problem and returning to Joy Silk likely will fix it. 
But if the solution is as simple and readily available as I contend, 
then why has it not been implemented already?  Why is it not currently 
on Labor’s agenda for reforming U.S. Labor law?  Why has the Labor 
Movement instead expended all of its political capital twice on enacting 
a legislative fix? 
The best answer I can provide is that Labor initially perceived 
Gissel as a victory.
242
  Indeed, no cause existed in 1969 to view it as a 
loss.  Joy Silk was abandoned in such an irregular fashion that it was 
difficult to interpret its meaning.  Moreover, once Gissel was the law, 
Labor adopted the legal objective of making the doctrine as favorable 
as possible, while management counsel immediately set out to expose 
the doctrine’s inherent weaknesses and limitations.  For Labor to at any 
point acknowledge those weaknesses meant surrendering to 
management’s view. 
So instead of surrendering the prize it thought it had won, the 
Labor Movement dug in on the goal of making Gissel as effective as 
possible by urging aggressive enforcement and regular resort to 
injunctive relief under Section 10(j) of the Act.
243
  To the extent that 
this strategy was resisted by courts, Labor attributed this obstruction to 
the biases of a right-wing judiciary.  Labor was mistaken, however.  
The limitations of Gissel are inherent to the doctrine. 
In any event, Gissel can remain good law alongside Joy Silk.  It 
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may serve as an option for cases where a union does not request 
recognition from an employer prior to the commission of a rash of 
disabling ULPs or where a union obtains a majority as substantial 
ULPs are being committed.  But without Joy Silk, Gissel was a pyrrhic 
victory only, one that continues to set the stage for Labor’s inevitable 
and ultimate defeat. 
Returning to Joy Silk is not currently on the reform agenda of the 
Labor Movement.  If this Article is successful, it will be.  Restoring Joy 
Silk to U.S. labor law is both possible and necessary.  Forty-five years 
is long enough to wait.  The Labor Movement cannot afford to wait 
much more. 
 
